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Abstract 
In 2005, the Supreme Court case U.S. v. Booker (2005) increased judicial discretion (U.S. 
v. Booker, 2005). This paper analyzes the effects of that increase on sentencing outcomes. It adds 
to a body of literature assessing Booker’s impact by delineating the different effects depending 
on crime type. Specifically, I ask how the effects from Booker vary by crime type. Because 
judges’ personal experiences and ideologies may cause them to favor more or less punishment 
dependent on the type of crime, understanding the crime type variation in Booker’s effects will 
lead to a more accurate understanding of the overall implications from Booker. Using federal 
sentencing data from the United States Sentencing Commission, I estimate the effect of the 
interaction between Booker and specific crime types on sentence length. Additionally, I divide 
the data into subsets by crime type and assess the effect of Booker’s interaction with 
demographic variables for each subset. Generally, I find that Booker’s effects do vary by crime 







Judges retain the responsibility of sentencing convicted defendants to prison terms. The 
complexities of defining and implementing an equitable sentencing system have plagued 
lawmakers and resulted in policies adjusting the sentencing mechanisms. The 2005 Supreme 
Court case U.S. v. Booker attempted to improve the sentencing system by changing the 
constraints on judicial sentencing decisions. The case intended to “achieve greater uniformity in 
sentencing” between the unique facts of a case and the sentence by increasing judicial discretion 
in sentencing outcomes (U.S. v. Booker, 2005). The court reasoned that increased judicial 
discretion would allow judges to individually calibrate sentencing and thus increase accuracy and 
uniformity between similar case and their sentences. The intention and theoretical reasoning 
predicted better outcomes because increased discretion would “increase the likelihood that 
offenders who engage in similar real conduct would receive similar sentences” (U.S. v. Booker, 
2005). However, the uniformity between similar cases and sentences may come at the cost of 
uniformity between judges. Accordingly, because the decision fundamentally altered the 
sentencing system, its actual effects are difficult to fully predict. Thus, this paper addresses the 
question: how did Booker affect sentencing outcomes? 
 Because Booker increases judicial discretion, judicial decisions may become more 
influenced by idiosyncratic factors unrelated to a case. Increased influence from idiosyncratic 
factors poses concerns if it results in implicit discrimination. Implicit discrimination occurs when 
unconscious associations between particular immutable characteristics and behavioral traits 
affect decisions about people (Bertrand, Chugh, & Mullainathan, 2005). For example, if 
employers associate one’s female gender with taking more time off of work, then they may 
subconsciously look less favorably on each female candidate and end up hiring proportionally 
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less females. Implicit discrimination affects many different decision-makers throughout society, 
including sports referees, interviewers, and court judges. For example, a study done on English 
soccer games found that white referees are more likely to give yellow cards to non-white players 
(Gallo, Grund, & Reade, 2013). Additionally, a study about employment discrimination found 
that people more often awarded interview callbacks to individuals with European sounding 
names than those with Arab sounding names; even more, the European callback preferences 
correlated with implicit bias levels (Rooth, 2007). Furthermore, evidence supports implicit 
discrimination specifically in courts with one study finding that judges have implicit bias and 
that it can affect their decisions according to race (Rachlinski, Johnson, Wistrich, & Guthrie, 
2009). Because implicit discrimination can result in inequitable outcomes, understanding if and 
how Booker contributes to those inequities is imperative. 
Consequently, this paper intends to evaluate the effects of increased discretion from 
Booker on sentencing outcomes. However, assessing the effects is complicated by the 
idiosyncratic nature of the factors that affect judicial decisions. Because they are dependent on 
an individual judge’s experiences, the effects presumably vary by judge and may affect outcomes 
in different directions. The different directions can result in opposite outcomes cancelling each 
other out and understating the overall effect. For example, if sentences from harsh judges 
increase and sentences from lenient judges decrease, then the effects may counteract each other 
and leave the average sentence length statistically unchanged.  
Accordingly, I examine a yet unstudied nuance of Booker that theoretically affects 
variation in sentencing outcomes. Specifically, I ask how the effects from Booker vary by crime 
type for the four main crime types that comprise about 80% of all crime: drug trafficking, 
firearms, fraud, and immigration. Because judge’s personal experiences and ideologies may lead 
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judges to favor more or less punishment dependent on the type of crime, delineating the variation 
in Booker’s effects will lead to a more accurate understanding of the overall implications from 
Booker. Generally, I hypothesize that drug trafficking and immigration crimes would move in 
one direction and firearms and fraud crimes would move in the opposite direction after Booker 
because judges would be more influenced by personal ideologies. I hypothesize that as judges’ 
personal experiences and ideologies have more effect on their sentencing decision because of 
their increased discretion, their decisions will be more reflective of public sentiment regarding 
certain types of crimes. For example, drug crime penalties may go down as it becomes more of a 
public health issue and society recognizes more mental health challenges, like addiction. 
Additionally, firearms penalties may increase as mass shootings increase. Fraud and immigration 
crimes seem to be less affected by overarching current events and thus differences may be more 
reflective of the proportion of judges ruling with a liberal or conservative ideology. 
I answer this question using data from the United State Sentencing Commission (USSC) 
that tracks federal criminal cases including details about the nature of the crimes and defendants 
in addition to the sentencing outcomes for each case. I estimate the effect of the interaction 
between Booker and specific crime types on sentence length. Additionally, I divide the data into 
subsets by crime type and assess the effect of Booker’s interaction with demographic variables 
for each subset. This research adds to the literature on the effects of Booker by more specifically 
examining the relevance of crime type. Generally, I find that Booker’s effects do vary by crime 
type and that these variations also manifest in demographic variables between crime types. 
The duration of the paper explains these findings: section 1.2 explains the legal 
background that underlies the research question; section 2 analyzes literature regarding previous 
empirical analyses of Booker’s effects; section 3 discusses the empirical model and method to 
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assess the effect of crime type on sentencing outcomes; section 4 reports the results of the 
empirical model; section 5 concludes.  
1.2 Background 
Legal History 
In 2005, the United States Supreme Court expanded judicial discretion in their decision 
of U.S. v. Booker. Prior to Booker, strict mandatory guidelines constrained judges to ruling 
within specific sentence length ranges based on the Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) of 1984. The 
SRA substantially decreased judicial discretion. This decrease was in response to critiques of the 
judicial disparities in sentencing for similar cases. It created the United States Sentencing 
Commission (USSC), which in turn, essentially changed sentencing to a numerical formula. The 
formula produced a mandatory sentence range that judges used to assign a final sentence length. 
The mandatory nature of the ranges was affirmed in 1996 by the Supreme Court decision Koon 
v. U.S. It acknowledged that while judges could technically assign sentences outside of the 
mandatory range, departures required specific reasons and were subject to a strict appellate 
review standard. Additionally, the PROTECT Act from 2003 de-incentivized any departures by 
reporting non-compliant judges to higher courts, which augmented the mandatory nature of 
sentencing ranges (Gertner, 2010). 
Because mandatory guideline ranges largely displaced judicial discretion onto other 
parties instead of removing subjective discretion altogether, their constitutionality was 
challenged in Supreme Court Cases Blakely v. Washington in 2004 and U.S. v. Booker in 2005. 
Blakely addressed and struck down some problematic aspects of mandatory sentencing in the 
state of Washington and Booker extended the Blakely ruling by declaring mandatory sentencing 
unconstitutional for all federal circuits. Booker redressed the unconstitutionality by changing the 
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sentencing range guideline to advisory instead of mandatory and requiring juries or guilty pleas 
to determine all facts of the case. Booker included mechanisms for appellate courts to review the 
reasonableness of deviations from ranges, but subsequent cases established the wide breadth of a 
reasonable deviation. In 2007, Gall v. U.S. held that appellate courts could not assume that 
sentences outside the range were unreasonable and Kimbrough v. US held that justifiable reason 
could even include policy disagreements with the ranges themselves. This sentiment continued in 
2008 when Nelson v. U.S. affirmed a 2007 decision and held that the appellate court can, but 
lacks requirements for presuming reasonableness of sentences within range. Thus, the shift from 
a mandatory range to advisory range system in Booker was strictly upheld by precedent and even 
somewhat expanded by subsequent legislation (Gertner, 2010). 
Booker system 
 The sentencing system post Booker (fig 1) begins after arrest. When someone is arrested, 
prosecutors have the option to charge them with one or multiple crimes. Based on the charges, a 
defendant is assigned an initial point level according to the severity of their crime. Point values 
are set by the USSC and if multiple charges exist, then the charge with the highest level 
determines the initial level. After the charges by prosecutors determine the initial point level, two 
types of adjustments are made to the points: specific offense characteristic adjustments (SOCs) 
and other adjustments. Adjustments are based on accepted facts of the case, which can only be 
determined by a jury or plea bargain. Given the accepted facts, judges apply adjustments to the 
point level. A judge adds points to or subtracts points from the initial level according to SOCs 
and other adjustments that fit the accepted facts. Some SOCs and adjustments reflect factual 
details (e.g. If a weapon was present) while some reflect more subjective details (e.g. whether the 
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defendant accepted responsibility) (United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, 
2018).  
Based on the adjustments made from the accepted facts, judges report the defendant’s 
final level as a measure of the severity of their crime including relevant details beyond the initial 
charge. Then, judges refer to a grid produced by the USSC using a defendant’s final point level 
and criminal history points (6 categories for points ranging from 1-13), to determine the 
sentencing range guideline. After determining the range, a judge assigns a sentence length to the 
defendant. Before Booker, the USSC required judges to assign a sentence length within the 
range. After Booker, judges could optionally use the ranges to advise their sentence length 
decision, but could assign any other sentence as well. Regardless of whether the sentence falls 
within or outside of the range, the judge must justify the sentence’s reasonableness in their 
written decision regarding the case. If the case is appealed based on the reasonableness of the 
sentence, then the court must base the decision on whether the judge abused their discretion and 
not whether the sentence seemed correct given the facts (United States Sentencing Commission, 














Compared to mandatory sentencing ranges, advisory ranges reduce the effect of ranges 
on judicial decision-making relative to other constraints and a judge’s personal preferences and 
beliefs about how sentencing should be. Thus, other factors that comprise the judge’s decision 
constraints and/or individual preferences would have relatively more impact on judicial 
sentencing decisions and potentially alter sentencing outcomes. For example, a judge’s personal 
ideologies about how harshly certain crime types should be punished could affect their 
sentencing decision relative more after Booker.  
2 Literature Review 
By assessing the effects of Booker according to crime type, my paper contributes to a 
literature consisting of a number of studies on Booker that analyze its effects according to 
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different variables of interest. The previous studies will be grouped and discussed according to 
the different variables of interest they examined. First, some papers analyze Booker’s effects 
according to defendant demographic characteristics. Second, some papers analyze Booker’s 
effects according to circuit demographic characteristics. Third, some papers analyze Booker’s 
effects according to judge demographic characteristics. Fourth, one paper specifically analyzes 
Booker’s effects for white collar crime in New York. By analyzing the effects of Booker 
according to crime types broadly, including how that interacts with other demographic 
characteristics, this research adds a new perspective to the literature. 
A substantial subset of the empirical analyses explored how defendant demographic 
characteristics affected sentencing outcomes. Yang (2015) used data from 1993-2009 to compare 
sentence length across racial groups. The analysis tested whether disparities in sentencing post 
Booker varied by race and found that black defendants received longer sentence lengths, 
particularly from judges appointed after Booker (Yang, 2015). Nutting (2013) used data from 
years immediately before and after Booker to elucidate the differing effects on sentence length 
according to defendant demographics including gender, race, age, citizenship status, and 
education; he found lower sentences for women and high-school graduates (Nutting, 2013). Starr 
and Rehavi (2013) tested for racial disparities in charging by prosecutors, racial disparities in 
sentence length, and the magnitude of sentencing disparities that can be explained by charging 
disparities pre and post Booker. They found that when accounting for racial disparities in 
charging, racial disparities in sentence length by judges do not increase post Booker (Starr & 
Rehavi, 2013). Spohn (2011) and Stith (2008) did not conduct their own empirical analyses, but 
analyzed results produced by the USSC, and reported effects of demographic variables on 
sentence lengths (Spohn, 2011; Stith, 2008). While these studies did examine defendant 
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characteristics, they did not consider how these variables interacted with crime type. 
Accordingly, this paper will examine the effects of Booker according to crime type. 
Another substantial subset of the empirical analyses explored how circuit demographic 
characteristics affected sentencing outcomes. Kim, Cano, Kim, and Spohn (2016) found 
decreases in sentence length post Booker and continued decreases after affirming court decisions 
2007. Specifically, they also found that district characteristics including racial makeup, 
socioeconomic conditions, and political ideology moderated a sentence’s harshness (Kim et al., 
2016). Farrell and Ward (2011) found that proportional racial representation among judges and 
prosecutors decreased racial disparities in sentence length post Booker (Farrell & Ward, 2011). 
While these studies do consider circuit traits, they do not consider how these effects vary by 
crime type. Consequently, this paper will extend these studies by factoring in crime type to the 
analysis of Booker. 
Some of the empirical analyses explored how demographic judge characteristics affected 
sentencing outcomes. Scott (2009) analyzed the percentages of sentences below range for four 
specific judges in Boston from 2002 to 2008. The four judges represented different types of 
responses to Booker, although all types exhibited a decrease in below range departures 
immediately prior to Booker, during the strict mandatory range enforcement period, and an 
increase post Booker (Scott, 2009). Using data from 1994-2010, Yang (2013) found that judge 
gender, political ideology, severity type, experience (particularly under mandatory guidelines), 
court cultures, and mandatory minimums affected sentencing outcomes. The affected sentencing 
outcomes included sentence length, below range departures, and deviation from average court 
sentence. Yang also contextualized the judges within their circuits and tested the effects of 
circuit severity type on sentence length pre and post Booker (Yang, 2013). These studies do 
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consider the effects of Booker according to judge and circuit characteristics. However, none of 
them factor in the effect of crime types and how that interacts with judge and circuit 
characteristics. Thus, this paper will analyze these interactions. 
Some of the empirical analyses explored how crime type, particularly white collar crime, 
affected sentencing outcomes. Hewitt (2016) examined the effects of Booker on white collar 
crime in New York, where many high profile white collar cases are prosecuted. He noted that 
within the sentencing guidelines, as the loss amount increases, the penalty increases 
dramatically, independent of the accused individual’s level of culpability. In accordance he 
found that below range departures exist more commonly as the loss amount increases. 
Subsequently, he found that the amount of below range departures increased significantly post 
Booker for high loss cases (Hewitt, 2016). His study illustrates that the effects of Booker can 
vary depending on crime type and looked at one subset of crime type in the context of the 
guideline ranges. However, his study does not look at other differences based on other crime 
types. Accordingly, this paper will extend these explorations to include analyses of Booker 
effects on other categories of crime type. 
The current literature generally supports that Booker increased disparities according to 
the characteristics of defendants, judges, and circuits. However, most studies do not consider the 
effect of crime type on sentencing outcomes, or how these effects interact with demographic 
characteristic effects. Thus, this paper will test exactly that.  Understanding how the effects of 
Booker differ according to crime type is relevant to the broader literature because effects for all 
crime types may incorrectly express the nature or degree of the changes from Booker. Because 
Booker broadly increases discretion, the direction of changes are dependent on judicial 
preferences. Specifically, judicial preferences may affect sentence lengths in different directions 
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according to crime type because of ideological differences. If different crime types are affected 
by Booker in different directions, then they may cancel out and understate the overall effect. 
Thus, the conclusions this paper draws about the effects of Booker according to crime types will 
help ascertain the accurate degree that Booker affected sentence lengths. 
3 Methods 
Data 
This paper uses data from the United States Sentencing Commission (USSC), which is 
part of The Justice Department. The USSC began compiling the data in 1984 after the 
Sentencing Reform Act (SRA) created the USSC and established the sentencing guidelines 
(Gertner, 2010). The data is collected annually for federal district court cases that utilize the 
sentencing guidelines and qualify as constitutional. This study will examine data from October 1, 
2002 through September 30, 2016, which is the most recent released data. This time period 
includes the pre-Booker system (2002-2004) as well as the post-Booker system (2005-2016) as it 
is reiterated by later court cases. The data includes variables regarding the facts of a case, 
including defendant background information, as well as information related to specific details of 
the sentencing process and the districts where cases are decided. While it includes related 
information, the identity of the defendant and presiding judge are not included (United States 
Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences, 2018).   
Data includes variables directly relevant to the sentencing process such as, initial offense 
level, final offense level, criminal history category, range minimum, and range maximum. It also 
includes variables representing defendant and case characteristics including race, sex, age, 
education level, citizenship status, country of citizenship (if not U.S.), number of dependents, 
pre-sentence detention status, whether the case was settled at trial or through a plea, and which 
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circuit decided the case. Finally, it includes many details related to the facts of the case that 
inform the sentencing process variables. For example, it included drug types and weights (if 
applicable), whether the crime included a victim, whether a weapon was present, whether the 
defendant accepted responsibility, whether the criminal obstructed justice, etc. (United States 
Sentencing Commission, Monitoring of Federal Criminal Sentences, 2018). Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 
2.3 show the summary statistics for primary variables from the data, and they indicate that 
average sentence length seems similar before and after Booker, but the standard deviation seems 
to have increased after Booker. Figure 3 and 4 expand on the summary. Figure 3 illustrates that 
crimes are largely concentrated in four main crime types. Figure 4 supports a potential general 
decrease in sentence length after Booker. Overall, the summary information seems to indicate a 
general decrease in sentence length post Booker and concentration of crime types into four main 
categories.  
Figure 2.1. Summary Statistics All Years (2002-2016)  
 
Figure 2.2. Summary Statistics Pre Booker (2002-2004)  
Variable   | Obs  Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
 Sentence Length  | 974,799 51.39953 80.47246 0 19080 
 Final Level*  | 974,787 18.91032 8.866345 1 49 
 Initial Level | 974,799 17.41579 10.00505 -3 48 
 Criminal History | 974,799 2.467998 1.700641 1 6 
 
* Variable excluded from regressions for endogeneity 
 
Variable   | Obs        Mean     Std. Dev. Min        Max 
 
 Sentence Length | 134,637    51.97471 72.5919 0 4860 
 Final Level* |     134,628    18.62394 8.901505 1 49 
 Initial Level |     134,637    17.70042 10.33467 0 46 
 Criminal History |     134,637    2.429132 1.704946 1 6 
 




Figure 2.3. Summary Statistics Post Booker (2005-2016) 
  
Fig 3. Crime Types Frequency. 
 
 
Variable   | Obs         Mean     Std. Dev. Min Max 
 
 Sentence Length | 840,162 51.30736    78.20333 0 19080 
 Final Level* |   840,159     18.95621    9.132691 1 47 
 Initial Level |   840,162     17.37018    9.973281 -3 48 
 Criminal History |   840,162     2.474226    1.688122 1 6 
 
* Variable excluded from regressions for endogeneity 
 
17 




Analogous to Nutting (2013), this model represents the estimation strategy for predictors 
of sentencing outcomes. Where i represents an individual defendant, j represents circuit, and k 
represents crime type, the equation is estimated as 
 
Sentenceijk = β0 + β1 Defendantijk + β2 Severityijk + β3 Crimeijk + β4 Yearijk + β5 Bookerijk + β6  
Bookerijk x Defendantijk + β7  Bookerijk x Severityijk+ β8  Bookerijk x Drugijk+ β9 Bookerijk x 
Firearmsijk+ β10 Bookerijk x Fraudijk + β11 Bookerijk x Immigrationijk + δj + ηk + εijk. 
 
Sentenceijk is the sentence outcome variable. It will be captured by sentence length in 
months. Defendantijk includes defendant specific variables including race, sex, age, citizenship 
status, education level, number of dependents, and plea (or trial) status. Severityijk represents the 
severity of the crime and is estimated using a combination of multiple variables. First, there is a 
measure for the criminal history of the defendant. Second, the initial level indicates the severity 
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based on the initial charge for a crime. Third, the final level indicates the severity based on the 
initial level and adjustments made based on more details about the crime. However, judges are 
responsible for assigning adjustments in addition to deciding the final sentence length. Thus, 
final level is endogenous and including it would bias coefficients upward, it is excluded. The 
positive bias exist because a judge’s preferences would positively correlate with both the crime 
severity measure and the sentence length. A judge’s underlying preference would result in them 
viewing a case more or less severely. Consequently, the preferences would affect measures 
related to severity like final level (measuring crime severity) and sentence length (measuring 
punishment severity) in the same direction. Crimeijk is a categorical variable representing the type 
of crime a defendant committed. Figure 5 in the appendix lists all the possible crime type 
categories. 
Yearijk is a counter variable to account for a linear time trend. It controls for changes over 
time independent of Booker. Including a year trend instead of year fixed effects allowed for 
easier interpretation given the context without detracting from the explanatory value because the 
results did not appear to change between the two methods. Bookerijk is a dummy variable with 
values to indicate whether a case occurs before Booker (2002-2004) or after Booker (2005-2016). 
Bookerijk x Defendanttjk is an interaction between the timing of the case relative to Booker 
and all the defendant characteristics. It will illustrate how the effects of Booker varied according 
to defendant specific variables. Bookerijk x Severityijk is an interaction between the timing of the 
case relative to Booker and the severity measures. It will illustrate how Booker affected aspects 
of the sentencing process in addition to sentence length. 
Next, the primary variables of interest are included to account for interactions between 
the main crime types and Booker. Four crime types comprise the majority of offenses: drug 
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trafficking (30.7%), firearms (10.5%), fraud (9.9%), and immigration (28.5%). The other 40 
crime types each comprise 3% or less of total offenses. Accordingly, Bookerijk x Drugijk is an 
interaction for Booker and drug trafficking cases, Bookerijk x Firearmsijk is an interaction for 
Booker and firearms cases, Bookerijk x Fraudijk is an interaction for Booker and fraud cases, and 
Bookerijk x Immigrationijk is an interaction for Booker and immigration cases. In addition to 
running regressions for all cases with variables for each of the main crime types, there will be a 
regression excluding immigration, as well as regressions only including cases for each of the 
main crime types. A regression will exclude immigration because it is theoretically different 
from other crimes. Regressions for cases of each crime type will be included to compare the 
defendant characteristic interaction variables between crime types. 
δj, and ηk  represent fixed effects for the circuit, and crime type respectively. These 
variables account for changes independent of Booker. εijk is the error term for all other 
unobserved variation. 
4 Results 
The results from estimating the Equation in the methods section are presented here and 
show the interactions between relevant variables and the pre and post Booker court case variable 
for the time period from 2002-2016. While only the relevant variables and interactions are 
included in each table, all results were run in accordance with the Equation described and the 
appendix includes the full results. 
The goal of these estimations is to illustrate how the effect of Booker on sentencing 
outcomes varies by crime type. The dependent variable is sentence length in months. The 
interactions of the four main crime types with Booker serve as the primary explanatory variables 
of interest. When used, each main crime type variable is compared to all other offenses. 
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Additionally, regressions using subsets of the data corresponding to each main crime type show 
the interactions of Booker with various demographic variables to provide further insight. 
Preliminary Model 
Table 1 shows results from the estimation of the Equation excluding any interaction 
terms. Additionally, column 1 excludes crime type, the primary explanatory variable. Column 2 
includes the crime type variables. These results illustrate the effect of Booker on a simpler 
version of the Equation and show the initial effect of crime type on sentence length. 
Table 1 generally illustrates that Booker significantly increased sentence length, even 
though the year variable shows that sentence length is generally decreasing over time. Thus, after 
controlling for other variables, Booker’s effect on sentence length counters the natural trend over 
time. Additionally the two measures of crime severity, criminal history and initial level, both 
significantly predict sentence length and are positive. This indicates that as crime severity 
increases, sentence length increases as well. Furthermore, most demographic variables 
significantly predict sentence length within the simplified model, although there are exceptions 
for race, unknown citizenship, and some iterations of education level. In general, when the race 
coefficients are significant, the Black coefficients are positive and the Hispanic coefficients are 
negative. These coefficients support that compared to Whites, Blacks receive longer sentences 
and Hispanics receive shorter sentences. The significant Female coefficient is negative, which 
supports that females receive shorter sentences compared to males. The demographic trends 
support that sentencing disparities do not happen uniformly across demographic factors. For 
example, gender seems more salient to sentencing differences than race because the coefficients 
are larger and more often significant. Because race and gender theoretically should not affect 
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sentencing, this may indicate that implicit associations between being male and criminal 
behavior are stronger than the associations between being non-white and criminal behavior. 
Table 1 
Predicting Sentence Length Without Interaction Terms. 
Dependent Variable: 
Sentence Length (months) 
  
        1 
Crime Type 
Excluded 
       2 
Crime Type 
Included 
Post Booker 1.413 1.027 
 (5.92)** (4.46)** 
Year Trend -0.070 -0.308 
 (3.27)** (14.70)** 
Criminal History 11.263 11.714 
 (268.16)** (277.76)** 
Initial Level 3.620 5.401 
 (501.54)** (420.64)** 
Black 0.171 5.285 
 (0.86) (27.04)** 
Hispanic -5.990 -0.387 
 (26.71)** (1.77) 
Other Non-White Race  -0.793 1.049 
 (2.13)* (2.84)** 
Female -10.410 -8.252 
 (51.78)** (41.84)** 
Resident/Legal Alien -3.202 -1.250 
 (9.87)** (3.99)** 
Illegal Alien 5.201 2.888 
 (24.13)** (12.27)** 
Citizenship Unknown -2.372 0.166 
 (3.97)** (0.29) 
Extradited Alien 10.472 7.376 
 (7.22)** (5.28)** 
H.S. Graduate 1.123 0.277 
 (6.74)** (1.72) 
Some College 3.216 -0.354 
 (15.47)** (1.75) 
College Graduate 6.934 0.166 
 (22.22)** (0.54) 
Number of Dependents 0.244 0.471 
 (6.44)** (12.90)** 
Trial 89.971 84.403 
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 (264.56)** (256.36)** 
Drug Trafficking  -108.329 
  (57.76)** 
Firearms  -80.900 
  (42.77)** 
Fraud  -46.040 
  (24.02)** 
Immigration  -62.050 
  (32.43)** 
_cons -54.179 -11.018 
 (59.83)** (5.22)** 
R2 0.37 0.41 
N 974,799 974,799 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Suppressed Variables: Circuit Fixed Effects, Offense Type Fixed Effects 
 
Main Results 
Table 2 shows the results of the full model (including interactions) of the Equation for the 
primary explanatory variables. It illustrates the interaction between Booker and the main crime 
types. First, the table illustrates that Booker’s effect is positive and bordering on conventional 
significance. The Post Booker variable represents the effect of Booker on sentence lengths for 
white, male, citizen, high school dropouts with plea deals who committed crimes outside of the 
four main categories (drug trafficking, firearms, fraud, and immigration). Because the crime type 
variables more specifically estimate Booker’s effect and the Booker variable represents the effect 
for all other crimes as the control variable, it seems reasonable that it is no longer significant. If 
variation after Booker occurred mostly for cases within the four main crime types, then capturing 
those effects in separate variables would reduce the variation captured by the Post Booker 
variable alone. While the Booker variable changed from Table 1, the significant negative time 
trend remains.  
Additionally, the crime severity coefficients significantly predict sentence length and 
significantly changed after Booker.  For instance, Booker seems to have decreased the positive 
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relationship between criminal history and sentence length. Higher criminal history is associated 
with relatively lower sentences than it was before Booker. This may mean that judges are taking 
criminal history into account relatively less than other factors. Beyond that, the positive 
relationship between initial level and sentence length significantly increased after Booker. This 
may mean that judges are more sensitive to the initial charges for crimes after Booker. The 
difference between the signs of the Booker X Criminal History and Booker X Initial Level 
variables may reflect variations in different groups of people within the sentencing process. For 
example, the Criminal History variable may reflect an individual’s previous crime committing 
decisions and decisions by anyone in the previous sentencing process, including arresting police 
officers, charging prosecutors, sentencing judges, etc. Any number of those decision-makers 
could have been affected by Booker in different ways. Initial level more specifically reflects the 
charges resulting from a prosecutor’s decisions. Because the different groups underlying the 
metrics for Criminal History and Initial Level may have been affected differently by Booker, it 
seems reasonable that the interaction coefficients reflect different directions. 
Next, as each compared to all other crimes, most of the main crime type categories 
significantly predict sentence length and significantly changed after Booker, although in varying 
directions. First, compared to all other crimes after Booker, drug trafficking appears to be 
relatively less severely punished because the Booker X Drug Trafficking coefficient is 
significantly negative. The associated marginal effect of drug trafficking crimes is -108.807 
months, which reiterates that drug trafficking crimes are less severely punished than all other 
crimes. The negative coefficient could reflect a change in judicial, and public, sentiment away 
from the ‘War on Drugs’ mentality in existence when the sentencing guidelines were created to 
more of a public health view (Drug Policy Alliance, n.d.). Compared to all other crimes after 
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Booker, firearms crimes seem to be relatively more severely punished because the Booker X 
Firearms coefficient is significantly positive. The associated marginal effect of firearms crimes is 
-79.934 months, which supports that while firearms crimes were more severely punished after 
Booker, they were still less severely punished than all other crimes overall. The positive 
coefficient could reflect judges’ efforts to capture the increases in gun violence and mass 
shootings that may not be encompassed in the original sentencing guidelines. Compared to all 
other crimes after Booker, fraud also appears to be punished relatively more severely after 
Booker because the Booker X Fraud coefficient is significantly positive. The associated marginal 
effect of fraud crimes is -45.289 months, which supports that while fraud crimes were more 
severely punished after Booker, they were still less severely punished than all other crimes 
overall. The positive coefficient could reflect changes in judicial sentiment regarding fraud 
crimes related to increased sophistication in digital technology. Compared to all other crimes 
after Booker, immigration does not seem to be punished significantly differently. Because the 
interaction is insignificant, the marginal reflects the value of the significant Immigration 
variable, which is -63.115 months and supports that immigration crimes were less severely 
punished than all other crimes. The lack of significance for the coefficient could reflect Judges’ 
abilities to decide in alignment with their personal ideologies, which may be increasingly 
disparate as immigration becomes a more salient issue. 
Listed in Table 2.2, the marginal effects indicate that, overall, the most common crime 
types are punished less severely than other crime types. Perhaps this trend reflects tendencies in 
criminal behavior to commit less severely punished crimes more often. Regardless, while all the 
marginal effects are negative, they illustrate different severity between the crime types. The 
crime types from least to most severely punished appear to be drug trafficking, firearms, 
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immigration, fraud, and lastly, all other crime types. In general, these results support that the 
effects of Booker differ by crime type, which in turn indicates that looking at Booker’s effects for 
all crime types together may understate its effects. 
Table 2.1 
Predicting Sentence Length With Crime Type Interactions. 
Dependent Variable: Sentence Length 
(months) 
 
     1 
Crime Type Interactions 
Post Booker 1.489 
 (1.90) 
Year Trend -0.308 
 (14.69)** 
Criminal History 12.717 
 (114.58)** 
Post Booker X Criminal History -1.152 
 (9.67)** 
Initial Level 5.310 
 (175.87)** 
Post Booker X Initial Level 0.099 
 (3.11)** 
Drug Trafficking -105.805 
 (53.71)** 



















* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Suppressed Variables: Circuit Fixed Effects, Offense Type Fixed Effects, Demographic Controls 
 
Table 2.2  











-105.805** -3.002** -108.807 
Firearms -87.727** 7.793** -79.934 
Fraud -51.853** 6.564** -45.289 
Immigration -63.115** 1.058 -63.115 
 
Table 3 estimates the Equation with a focus on the different crime types. As mentioned 
earlier, four crime types comprise the majority of offenses: drug trafficking (30.7%), firearms 
(10.5%), fraud (9.9%), and immigration (28.5%). The other 40 crime types each comprise 3% or 
less of total offenses. Each column estimates the Equation including only cases for a subset of 
crime types. Column 1 includes all crime types; column 2 includes only drug trafficking cases; 
column 3 includes only firearms cases; column 4 includes only fraud cases, and column 5 
includes only immigration cases. 
Generally, the results indicate that sentence lengths changed significantly for specific 
crime types after Booker, although they did not change significantly for all other crime types. It 
seems that because specific crime types changed in different directions, the net effect on 
sentence length for all other crimes was minimized, which would explain why the Post Booker 
variable for other crimes in column 1 is not significant.  
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Overall, the Booker variable indicates that Booker affected crime types differently. 
Compared to before Booker, all other crime types after Booker did not significantly change, 
which reiterates the finding from Table 2. Compared to before Booker, drug trafficking crimes 
after Booker seemed to receive higher sentences because the coefficient is significantly positive. 
While sentiment towards drug addiction and the associated crimes may be decreasing drug 
trafficking sentences relative to all other crimes, the positive coefficient for drug trafficking 
sentences relative to themselves before Booker represents a more nuanced story. The change in 
judicial and public opinion regarding drug addiction may also increase the gap between drug 
possession and drug trafficking and thus reflected in higher sentences for drug trafficking with 
potentially lower sentences for simple possession. Compared to before Booker, firearms crimes 
after Booker did not receive significantly different sentences, although the coefficient is trending 
towards significance. The insignificance could reflect increased differentiation by judges 
between types of firearms crimes that are more and less severe. Compared to before Booker, 
fraud crimes after Booker seemed to receive lower sentences because the coefficient is 
significantly negative. The decrease relative to themselves before Booker, could reflect recorded 
beliefs among judges that the guidelines for fraud crimes overemphasized the money amount 
related to the crime instead of degree of involvement and other factors (Hewitt, 2016). Compared 
to before Booker, immigration crimes after Booker seemed to receive lower sentences because 
the coefficient is significantly negative. The negative coefficient could indicate that as 
immigration increases, more immigrants could be charged with simply residing in the United 
States as opposed to engaging in criminal activity, which judges may view as less severe than the 
guidelines mandated. The Booker coefficients for most of the crime type categories are 
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significant, although some are positive and some are negative. Thus, these results support that 
looking at all crime types together may understate the effect of Booker on sentence lengths.  
As discussed earlier, the interaction between Booker and the criminal history category 
and initial level were significant in Table 2, and that trend seems to continue for the crime type 
categories in Table 3. Generally, the Booker X Criminal History coefficients were negative and 
the Booker X Initial Level coefficients were positive for the different crime types, which is 
consistent with the overall results. However, the Booker X Criminal History coefficient for fraud 
was significantly positive, which counters the trend. This result indicates that judges may be 
more sensitive to criminal history in fraud cases than other cases. Additionally, the Booker X 
Initial Level coefficients are negative for drug trafficking and firearms, but positive for fraud, 
immigration, and other crimes. Thus, these results support that the effects of Booker varied by 
crime type and the different directions of their effects may indicate that looking at all crime types 
together does not accurately capture the effects of Booker. 
The interactions between demographic variables and Booker demonstrate variations by 
crime type in sentencing as well. First, after Booker and compared to Whites, other races seemed 
to receive higher sentences. The Booker X Black coefficient was significantly higher for all other 
crimes, firearms, and immigration. The Booker X Hispanic coefficient was significantly higher 
for drug trafficking. Listed in Tables 3.2-3.6, the marginal effects generally support that after 
Booker Blacks and Hispanics receive longer sentences than Whites. However, for Fraud crimes, 
Blacks and Hispanics appear to receive shorter sentences and for some crime types, Hispanics 
did not receive significantly different sentences.  
These results potentially support an increase in implicit discrimination after Booker 
because after controlling for crime severity and other details about the crime, non-Whites seem 
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to receive higher sentences. Because judges had more discretion after Booker, they could be 
more influenced by subconscious associations between non-White races and criminal behavior. 
Furthermore, the differences according to crime type indicate that specific criminal behaviors 
may be more implicitly associated with particular races. While implicit discrimination is a 
potential explanation for the significant coefficients, the race variable could also be capturing a 
different unobserved factor relevant to sentencing. Thus, the results potentially support, but do 
not prove the existence of implicit discrimination resulting from Booker. 
After Booker and compared to males, females seemed to receive different sentences 
depending on crime type. The Booker X Female coefficients are significantly lower for drug 
trafficking and fraud, significantly higher for immigration, and not significant for all other 
crimes. These results support that judges looked more favorably on females for certain crimes 
and more disfavorably for others, which may again illustrate implicit discrimination. The 
different directions of the coefficients for the crime types support that failing to differentiate by 
crime type may understate the effect of Booker. 
After Booker and compared to citizens, non-citizens seemed to receive higher sentences 
according to crime type. The Booker X Resident/Legal Alien coefficient was significantly higher 
for fraud and immigration. The Booker X Illegal Alien coefficient was significantly higher for all 
other crimes, drug trafficking, and immigration. These results support possible implicit 
discrimination from associations between non-citizens and certain types of criminal behavior. 
They also support a potential understatement and/or inaccuracy of Booker’s effects when only 
looking at all crime types together. 
After Booker and compared to high school drop-outs, individuals with more education 
seemed to receive lower sentences for certain crime types. The Booker X H.S. Graduate 
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coefficient was significantly lower for immigration, the Booker X Some College coefficient was 
significantly lower for firearms, and the all other crimes coefficient was significant for neither 
crime. These results support possible implicit discrimination from associations between lack of 
education and certain types of criminal behavior. They also indicate that looking at all crime 
types together potentially understates the effect of Booker. 
After Booker, a higher number of dependents appeared to decrease the sentence severity. 
The Booker X Number of Dependents variable was significantly positive for all other crime 
types and immigration. These results that judges were potentially more lenient towards 
defendants with more dependents, which potentially illustrates implicit discrimination. They also 
support that looking all crime types together potentially inaccurately represents the effect from 
Booker because the significance may be driven by the significance of one crime type alone. 
After Booker and compared to plea deals, sentences decided after a case went to trial 
were generally higher. The Booker X Trial coefficient was significantly higher for all other 
crime types together, drug trafficking, fraud and immigration. It was significantly negative for 
firearms. Additionally, the coefficients for fraud and immigration were much higher than all 
other categories. These results indicate that judges potentially look less favorably on individuals 
who go to trial. The apparent substantial difference in the size of the coefficients for each crime 
type indicate that looking at all crime types together may understate or inaccurately represent the 







Predicting Sentence Length By Crime Type With Demographic Interactions. 
Dependent Variable: Sentence Length (months) 
     1 
All 
    2 
Drug T. 
     3 
Firearms 
    4 
Fraud 
        5 
Immigration 
Post Booker 1.489 8.877 7.027 -5.392 -5.964 
 (1.90) (7.48)** (1.92) (3.83)** (6.23)** 
Year Trend -.308 -0.965 0.185 0.760 -0.452 
 (14.69)** (34.88)** (1.93) (19.06)** (43.63)** 
Criminal History 12.717 17.407 9.737 4.844 7.821 
 (114.58)** (120.37)** (20.04)** (20.28)** (118.65)** 
Post Booker X Criminal History -1.152 -0.822 -1.907 1.768 -1.528 
 (9.67)** (5.27)** (3.66)** (6.83)** (21.93)** 
Initial Level 5.310 5.585 6.914 1.442 1.457 
 (175.87)** (167.50)** (43.91)** (13.32)** (22.82)** 
Post Booker X Initial Level 0.099 -0.205 -0.028 0.448 0.856 
 (3.11)** (5.72)** (0.17) (3.95)** (12.41)** 
Post Booker X Black 1.206 1.015 6.958 0.572 2.264 
 (2.35)* (1.55) (3.64)** (0.71) (3.31)** 
Post Booker X Hispanic 0.115 1.936 -0.606 -1.199 0.084 
 (0.20) (2.94)** (0.20) (1.04) (0.18) 
Post Booker X Other Non-White Race 1.275 3.330 -2.907 -1.366 -0.898 
 (1.30) (2.31)* (0.56) (0.84) (1.00) 
Post Booker X Female -0.857 -1.409 -5.790 -3.029 1.136 
 (1.54) (2.00)* (1.34) (3.84)** (2.67)** 
Post Booker X Resident/Legal Alien -0.362 0.332 -1.078 3.148 2.875 
 (0.44) (0.38) (0.15) (2.28)* (4.71)** 
Post Booker X Illegal Alien 1.797 2.338 -2.990 1.453 3.013 
 (2.70)** (3.13)** (0.62) (0.99) (7.86)** 
Post Booker X Citizenship Unknown 1.619 0.825 22.580 3.261 2.782 
 (1.21) (0.62) (1.74) (1.19) (2.97)** 
Post Booker X H.S. Graduate 0.136 -0.452 -1.916 1.027 -1.019 
 (0.30) (0.84) (1.04) (1.02) (3.36)** 
Post Booker X Some College -0.038 -0.851 -5.919 1.661 0.128 
 (0.07) (1.22) (2.17)* (1.64) (0.27) 
Post Booker X College Graduate -1.342 0.451 -3.999 1.076 0.019 
 (1.54) (0.31) (0.59) (0.92) (0.02) 
Post Booker X Number of Dependents -0.628 0.054 -0.285 0.083 -0.174 
 (5.93)** (0.40) (0.54) (0.39) (3.23)** 
Post Booker X Trial 4.681 -5.602 38.971 14.759 2.298 
 (5.26)** (5.01)** (12.45)** (9.37)** (2.62)** 
_cons -11.034 -147.195 -129.670 -9.419 -12.997 
 (5.01)** (99.82)** (26.32)** (5.19)** (10.05)** 
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R2 0.41 0.59 0.29 0.18 0.35 
N 974,799 332,929 110,277 97,613 250,313 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
Suppressed Variables: Circuit Fixed Effects, Offense Type Fixed Effects 
 
Table 3.2  
Race Marginal Effects for Drug Trafficking Crimes. 
 
  
Race Coefficient Booker X Race Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Black 5.877** 1.015 5.877 
Hispanic 3.007** 1.936** 4.934 
 
Table 3.3  
Race Marginal Effects for Firearms Crimes. 
  
  
Race Coefficient Booker X Race Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Black -1.994 6.958** 6.958 
Hispanic 1.926 -0.606 -- 
 
Table 3.4  
Race Marginal Effects for Fraud Crimes. 
  
  
Race Coefficient Booker X Race Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Black -3.497** 0.572 -3.497 




Race Marginal Effects for Immigration Crimes. 
  
  
Race Coefficient Booker X Race Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Black -0.547 2.264** 2.264 
Hispanic 0.497 0.084 -- 
 
Table 3.5 
Race Marginal Effects for Other Crimes. 
  
  
Race Coefficient Booker X Race Coefficient Marginal Effect 
Black 4.239** 1.206* 5.445 
Hispanic -0.534 0.115 -- 
 
Table 4 further explores the relationship between the effects of Booker depending on 
crime type and race. Given the results in Table 5 indicating the significance of race coefficients 
for most crime types, it seems relevant to additionally analyze these factors. Accordingly, Table 
6 estimates the Equation for all crime types, but additionally includes an interaction term for 
Booker, crime type, and race. The results of the three variable interactions are reported in column 
1.  
The results from Table 4 indicate that compared to Blacks and Hispanics who committed 
drug trafficking crimes before Booker, Blacks and Hispanics who committed drug trafficking 
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crimes after Booker seemed to receive longer sentences by 3.9 and 9.5 months, respectively. 
Furthermore, compared to Blacks and Hispanics who committed firearms crimes before Booker, 
Blacks and Hispanics who committed firearms crimes after Booker seemed to receive longer 
sentences by 10.8 and 9.9 months, respectively. Moreover, compared to Blacks and Hispanics 
who committed fraud crimes before Booker, Blacks and Hispanics who committed fraud crimes 
after Booker seemed to receive longer sentences by 5.4 and 8.7 months, respectively. Moreover, 
compared to Hispanics who committed immigration crimes before Booker, Hispanics who 
committed immigration crimes after Booker seemed to receive longer sentences by 6.1 months, 
but Blacks were not significantly affected. Potentially, the Hispanic coefficient is significant 
while the Black one is not because Hispanics comprise a higher proportion of immigrants, both 
legal and illegal (Homeland Security, 2020). Overall the results support that Blacks and 
Hispanics appear to receive longer sentences after Booker than before. The amounts also seem to 
differ by crime type, although generally, sentences for Hispanics appeared to change more after 
Booker than sentences for Blacks. Generally, these results reiterate the more nuanced nature of 
Booker's effects when delineated by crime type and supplement Table 5 in reporting a more 
detailed account of variations according to crime type and race. Additionally, the marginal 
effects listed in Table 4.2 generally indicate that Blacks and Hispanics received longer sentences 
for all the main crime types except for Fraud where the received shorter sentences. These results 










Predicting Sentence Length with Booker, Crime Type, and Race Interaction. 
Dependent Variable: Sentence Length (months)  
 1 
Three 






Other Non-White Race 0.168 
 (0.12) 
Post Booker X Black -3.022 
 (3.01)** 
Post Booker X Hispanic -7.357 
 (6.36)** 
Post Booker X Other Non-White Race 0.824 
 (0.55) 
Drug Trafficking -106.256 
 (51.70)** 
Post Booker X Drug Trafficking -6.718 
 (7.19)** 
Drug Trafficking X Black 11.515 
 (9.72)** 
Drug Trafficking X Hispanic -8.809 
 (7.06)** 
Drug Trafficking X Other Non-White Race  -1.363 
 (0.61) 
Post Booker X Drug Trafficking X Black 3.901 
 (3.03)** 
Post Booker X Drug Trafficking X Hispanic 9.455 
 (7.00)** 




Post Booker X Firearms 1.325 
 (1.22) 
Firearms X Black -0.468 
 (0.33) 
Firearms X Hispanic -3.787 
 (1.97)* 
Firearms X Other Non-White Race 7.435 
 (2.20)* 
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Post Booker X Firearms X Black 10.828 
 (7.01)** 
Post Booker X Firearms X Hispanic 9.880 
 (4.80)** 




Post Booker X Fraud 3.858 
 (3.84)** 
Fraud X Black -7.661 
 (5.14)** 
Fraud X Hispanic -12.118 
 (6.34)** 
Fraud X Other Non-White Race 0.012 
 (0.00) 
Post Booker X Fraud X Black 5.371 
 (3.32)** 
Post Booker X Fraud X Hispanic 8.714 
 (4.25)** 




Post Booker X Immigration -0.430 
 (0.24) 
Immigration X Black -2.296 
 (0.86) 
Immigration X Hispanic -5.584 
 (2.91)** 
Immigration X Other Non-White Race -3.508 
 (0.99) 
Post Booker X Immigration X Black 3.855 
 (1.33) 
Post Booker X Immigration X Hispanic 6.059 
 (2.94)** 






* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 





























7.183** -7.357** -8.809** 9.455** 0.472 
Black  
Firearms 
0.939 -3.022** -0.468 10.828** 7.806 
Hispanic  
Firearms 
7.183** -7.357** -3.787* 9.880** 5.919 
Black  
Fraud 
0.939 -3.022** -7.661** 5.371** -5.312 
Hispanic  
Fraud 
7.183** -7.357** -12.118* 8.714** -3.578 
Black  
Immigration 
0.939 -3.022** -2.296 3.855 -3.022 
Hispanic 
Immigration 
7.183** -7.357** -5.584** 6.059** 0.301 
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Effect Size and Robustness 
 Beyond the specific analyses described above, the effect size according to Cohen’s d 
indicates that the difference in sentence length before and after Booker is about .009 standard 
deviations. 
Tables 5 and 6 reflect estimations that explore potential theoretical threats to the 
estimation’s validity and the related adjustments. They specifically look at the endogeneity of 
crime severity variables and inherent differences between immigration and other crimes, 
respectively. 
Table 5 explores the endogeneity of the crime severity variable. As discussed earlier, 
initial level and final level both offer measures of a crime’s severity. Theoretically, final level 
provides a more accurate measure because it includes the initial level as well as adjustments 
based on other details of a crime. However, final level is endogenous because the adjustments 
and the dependent variable, sentence length, are both decided by the judge, and thus, they are 
both factors of unobservable defendant characteristics that may vary according to unobservable 
judge characteristics. A judge may factor observations about a defendant’s demeanor, mental 
health status, etc. into decisions regarding the final level and sentence length. Moreover, each 
judge may interpret and adjust final level and sentence length differently depending on their 
personal ideologies and experiences. Because unobservable would affect final level and sentence 
length in the same direction, including final level in the estimation would bias estimates upward, 
as discussed earlier. Accordingly, the final level is omitted from the full regression and only the 
initial level is used. Table 5 represents the effects of including initial level and excluding final 
level. Column 1 represents results when initial level is included in the Equation and column 2 
represents results when final level is included in the Equation.  
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The Post Booker variable seems to illustrate positive bias from the endogeneity. When 
final level is included, the Post Booker coefficient is higher and significant at the p < 0.01 level, 
but with only initial level, the coefficient is lower and only bordering on significance at the p < 
0.05 level. Beyond the endogeneity effects, the different signs of the significant Post Booker X 
Initial Level and Post Booker X Final Level coefficients seems notable. Initial Level primarily 
reflects the charges from prosecutors while Final Level includes a judge’s influence, so the Post 
Booker differences potentially reflects that prosecutors and judges were affected by Booker 
differently on average.  
Table 5 
Predicting Sentence Length with Endogenous Crime Severity Variable. 
Dependent Variable: Sentence Length 
(months) 
  
   1   
  Initial Level 
       2 
   Final Level 
Post Booker 1.489 4.559 
 (1.90) (6.34)** 
Year Trend -0.308 -0.607 
 (14.69)** (30.51)** 
Criminal History 12.717 8.382 
 (114.58)** (77.82)** 
Post Booker X Criminal History -1.152 -0.569 
 (9.67)** (4.93)** 
Initial Level 5.310  
 (175.87)**  
Post Booker X Initial Level 0.099  
 (3.11)**  
Final Level  5.432 
  (224.79)** 
Post Booker X Final Level  -0.179 
  (7.03)** 
Drug Trafficking -105.805 -103.246 
 (53.71)** (56.02)** 
Post Booker X Drug Trafficking -3.002 0.831 
 (4.28)** (1.49) 
Firearms -87.727 -94.566 
 (44.06)** (50.27)** 
Post Booker X Firearms 7.793 7.769 
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 (10.77)** (11.57)** 
Fraud -51.853 -93.028 
 (25.74)** (49.31)** 
Post Booker X Fraud 6.564 -3.220 
 (9.02)** (4.81)** 
Immigration -63.115 -101.467 
 (31.17)** (53.32)** 
Post Booker X Immigration 1.058 5.173 
 (1.36) (7.09)** 
Post Booker X Black 1.206 0.366 
 (2.35)* (0.75) 
Post Booker X Hispanic 0.115 1.309 
 (0.20) (2.39)* 
Post Booker X Other Non-White Race 1.275 0.532 
 (1.30) (0.57) 
Post Booker X Female -0.857 -0.909 
 (1.54) (1.72) 
Post Booker X Resident/Legal Alien -0.362 -1.409 
 (0.44) (1.80) 
Post Booker X Illegal Alien 1.797 1.664 
 (2.70)** (2.63)** 
Post Booker X Citizenship Status 
Unknown 
1.619 1.016 
 (1.21) (0.80) 
Post Booker X H.S. Graduate 0.136 -0.670 
 (0.30) (1.55) 
Post Booker X Some College -0.038 -1.313 
 (0.07) (2.44)* 
Post Booker X College Graduate -1.342 -3.415 
 (1.54) (4.11)** 
Post Booker X Number of Dependents -0.628 -0.469 
 (5.93)** (4.66)** 
Post Booker X Trial 4.681 4.858 
 (5.26)** (5.66)** 
_cons -11.034 8.663 
 (5.01)** (4.20)** 
R2 0.41 0.47 
N 974,799 976,295 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
                 Suppressed Variables: Circuit Fixed Effects, Offense Type Fixed Effects 
 
Table 6 explores a potential theoretical concern regarding immigration crimes. Because 
an immigration crime simply denotes one’s presence in the U.S. and is not necessarily associated 
with a specific criminal behavior, immigration crimes may be inherently different from other 
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crime types. Accordingly, Table 6 estimates the Equation for all crimes, including immigration, 
in column 1 and estimates the Equation for all crimes, excluding immigration, in column 2. 
Overall, the coefficients in the two columns appear similar in direction, degree, and significance. 
One small difference exists for the Post Booker X Black variable. It is significant when 
immigration cases are included, but insignificant when they are excluded, which indicates a 
disproportionately higher change in sentence length according to race for immigration crimes, 
when compared to other crimes. Additionally, the two columns also differ in the degree of the 
Booker variable’s insignificance. While the Booker coefficient for all crimes including 
immigration trends on conventional significance, the Booker coefficient for all crimes excluding 
immigration is notably less close to significance. Accordingly, it seems that immigration crimes 
may be driving the increased variation before and after Booker observed in column 1. However, 
these, and other differences, seem minimal enough to justify estimating the Equation for all 
crimes, including immigration in the main results. 
Table 6 
Predicting Sentence Length With and Without Immigration Crimes. 









Post Booker 1.489 0.826 
 (1.90) (0.88) 
Year Trend -0.308 -0.374 
 (14.69)** (13.41)** 
Criminal History 12.717 13.370 
 (114.58)** (92.86)** 
Post Booker X Criminal History -1.152 -0.647 
 (9.67)** (4.17)** 
Initial Level 5.310 5.325 
 (175.87)** (151.50)** 
Post Booker X Initial Level 0.099 0.098 
 (3.11)** (2.64)** 
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Drug Trafficking -105.805 -105.217 
 (53.71)** (46.58)** 
Post Booker X Drug Trafficking -3.002 -2.879 
 (4.28)** (3.56)** 
Firearms -87.727 -87.773 
 (44.06)** (38.43)** 
Post Booker X Firearms 7.793 7.308 
 (10.77)** (8.78)** 
Fraud -51.853 -50.842 
 (25.74)** (22.00)** 
Post Booker X Fraud 6.564 6.778 
 (9.02)** (8.12)** 
Immigration -63.115  
 (31.17)**  
Post Booker X Immigration 1.058  
 (1.36)  
Post Booker X Black 1.206 0.869 
 (2.35)* (1.45) 
Post Booker X Hispanic 0.115 0.660 
 (0.20) (0.94) 
Post Booker X Other Non-White Race 1.275 1.492 
 (1.30) (1.27) 
Post Booker X Female -0.857 -1.313 
 (1.54) (1.95) 
Post Booker X Resident/Legal Alien -0.362 -0.330 
 (0.44) (0.33) 
Post Booker X Illegal Alien 1.797 2.080 
 (2.70)** (2.31)* 
Post Booker X Citizenship Unknown 1.619 1.717 
 (1.21) (1.04) 
Post Booker X H.S. Graduate 0.136 0.118 
 (0.30) (0.21) 
Post Booker X Some College -0.038 0.286 
 (0.07) (0.42) 
Post Booker X College Graduate -1.342 -0.961 
 (1.54) (0.92) 
Post Booker X Number of Dependents -0.628 -0.759 
 (5.93)** (5.45)** 
Post Booker X Trial 4.681 4.610 
 (5.26)** (4.38)** 
_cons -11.034 -13.952 
 (5.01)** (5.49)** 
R2 0.41 0.39 
N 974,799 724,486 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 





 This paper aims to evaluate the effects of Booker, and the associated increased judicial 
discretion, on sentencing outcomes and determine if and how these effects varied by crime type. 
This topic adds to the existing literature on Booker by using variation by crime type to provide 
more accurate reports of the overall effects of Booker, especially as it relates to the prevalence of 
implicit discrimination. This paper accomplished its goal using federal sentencing data to assess 
how the interaction of Booker and crime type affected sentence length, as well as how the effect 
of the interaction of Booker and defendant demographic characteristics on sentence length varied 
for cases of different crime types. 
Overall, the results illustrate the potential implicit discrimination after Booker and the 
variability of Booker’s effects by crime type. Because of the variation by crime type, analyzing 
Booker for all crime types together may understate or inaccurately represent its actual effects. As 
sentences for some crime types increased after Booker and sentences for other crime types 
decreased, the net effect may seem minimal. However, looking at effects by crime type provided 
a more accurate understanding of the actual effects. 
These results also illustrate a mixed picture about the efficacy of Booker for improving 
the accuracy of sentencing outcomes. Variations in sentence lengths by crime type after Booker 
may more accurately represent judges’ understanding of the cases. While the mandatory 
sentencing guidelines were created at one time and captured one version of accurate sentencing, 
increased discretion allows judges to adjust their preferences to match public sentiment at the 
time. However, it also allows implicit associations to affect sentencing more, which results in 
increased implicit discrimination. Thus, the benefits of increased judicial discretion are 
potentially undermined by the associated effects of implicit discrimination. 
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Regardless, this paper demonstrates the necessity of understanding the effects of Booker 
as they vary by crime type. In the future, these results can be extended by exploring further 
variation in Booker’s effects and used to inform policymakers about the implications of 
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Appendix 
Figure 5 
All Offense Types 
 
 
Table 1, full 
Predicting Sentence Length Without Interaction Terms. 
Sentence Length (mo.)     1 
Crime Types 
Excluded             
   2 
Crime Types 
Included 
Post Booker 1.413 1.027 
 (5.92)** (4.46)** 
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Criminal History 11.263 11.714 
 (268.16)** (277.76)** 
Initial Level 3.620 5.401 
 (501.54)** (420.64)** 
Black 0.171 5.285 
 (0.86) (27.04)** 
Hispanic -5.990 -0.387 
 (26.71)** (1.77) 
Other Non-White Race -0.793 1.049 
 (2.13)* (2.84)** 
Female -10.410 -8.252 
 (51.78)** (41.84)** 
Resident/Legal Alien -3.202 -1.250 
 (9.87)** (3.99)** 
Illegal Alien 5.201 2.888 
 (24.13)** (12.27)** 
Citizenship Unknown -2.372 0.166 
 (3.97)** (0.29) 
Extradited Alien 10.472 7.376 
 (7.22)** (5.28)** 
H.S. Graduate 1.123 0.277 
 (6.74)** (1.72) 
Some College 3.216 -0.354 
 (15.47)** (1.75) 
College Graduate 6.934 0.166 
 (22.22)** (0.54) 
Number of Dependents 0.244 0.471 
 (6.44)** (12.90)** 
Trial 89.971 84.403 
 (264.56)** (256.36)** 
Year Trend -0.070 -0.308 
 (3.27)** (14.70)** 
Maine 7.169 14.319 
 (4.50)** (9.33)** 
Massachusetts 5.930 11.155 
 (5.18)** (10.11)** 
New Hampshire 6.108 14.361 
 (4.11)** (10.02)** 
Puerto Rico 21.738 25.248 
 (20.92)** (25.21)** 
Rhode Island 6.925 10.826 
 (4.16)** (6.75)** 
Connecticut 0.184 6.166 
 (0.15) (5.30)** 
New York East -4.043 -0.881 
 (4.10)** (0.93) 
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New York North 10.687 14.911 
 (9.04)** (13.10)** 
New York South 6.152 7.797 
 (6.46)** (8.50)** 
New York West 6.971 12.822 
 (6.29)** (12.00)** 
Vermont -12.561 -3.941 
 (8.31)** (2.71)** 
Delaware 1.957 2.602 
 (1.10) (1.52) 
New Jersey 6.581 8.568 
 (6.39)** (8.64)** 
Penn. East 15.517 15.982 
 (15.05)** (16.09)** 
Penn. Mid 9.122 15.489 
 (7.90)** (13.92)** 
Penn. West 10.605 14.312 
 (8.98)** (12.58)** 
Virgin Islands 2.123 9.435 
 (1.01) (4.65)** 
Maryland 19.971 19.794 
 (18.81)** (19.36)** 
N Carolina East 31.372 32.357 
 (28.90)** (30.94)** 
N Carolina Mid 26.119 27.171 
 (22.25)** (24.02)** 
N Carolina West 23.890 26.072 
 (21.07)** (23.88)** 
South Carolina 25.445 27.151 
 (25.33)** (28.04)** 
Virginia East 30.001 31.336 
 (30.66)** (33.26)** 
Virginia West 18.970 24.533 
 (16.31)** (21.90)** 
W Virginia North 0.536 16.717 
 (0.42) (13.74)** 
W Virginia South 6.452 20.221 
 (4.82)** (15.67)** 
Louisiana East 21.622 25.515 
 (17.95)** (22.00)** 
Louisiana Middle 15.895 17.384 
 (10.25)** (11.65)** 
Louisiana West 24.127 24.441 
 (19.33)** (20.33)** 
Miss. North 8.639 11.332 
 (5.66)** (7.71)** 
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Miss. South 17.477 19.135 
 (14.04)** (15.97)** 
Texas East 18.156 23.678 
 (17.71)** (23.98)** 
Texas North 32.882 33.195 
 (33.01)** (34.60)** 
Texas South 9.663 12.428 
 (10.86)** (14.47)** 
Texas West 7.244 14.322 
 (8.13)** (16.66)** 
Kentucky East 11.243 21.607 
 (9.96)** (19.87)** 
Kentucky West 12.134 16.531 
 (9.50)** (13.43)** 
Michigan East 11.546 13.910 
 (11.11)** (13.90)** 
Michigan West 20.826 23.112 
 (17.42)** (20.08)** 
Ohio North 8.015 11.592 
 (7.74)** (11.61)** 
Ohio South 3.477 6.449 
 (3.18)** (6.12)** 
Tennessee East 20.752 27.688 
 (19.41)** (26.88)** 
Tennessee Mid 13.917 16.440 
 (10.62)** (13.02)** 
Tennessee West 13.654 16.312 
 (12.32)** (15.28)** 
Illinois Cent 33.356 34.015 
 (27.10)** (28.70)** 
Illinois North 18.285 18.901 
 (17.97)** (19.28)** 
Illinois South 29.845 33.140 
 (23.85)** (27.50)** 
Indiana North 10.091 14.051 
 (8.33)** (12.04)** 
Indiana South 32.974 33.668 
 (26.04)** (27.61)** 
Wisconsin East 3.170 7.792 
 (2.64)** (6.74)** 
Wisconsin West 21.064 25.906 
 (13.79)** (17.61)** 
Arkansas East 8.970 16.347 
 (7.19)** (13.60)** 
Arkansas West 17.424 19.079 
 (12.61)** (14.34)** 
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Iowa North 29.191 32.519 
 (23.88)** (27.61)** 
Iowa South 22.239 22.924 
 (18.35)** (19.64)** 
Minnesota 7.647 9.751 
 (6.63)** (8.77)** 
Missouri East 6.370 9.304 
 (6.18)** (9.38)** 
Missouri West 10.845 12.819 
 (10.36)** (12.71)** 
Nebraska 10.666 14.568 
 (9.77)** (13.85)** 
North Dakota 10.204 11.582 
 (7.22)** (8.50)** 
South Dakota 9.183 14.289 
 (7.61)** (12.26)** 
Alaska 5.179 10.104 
 (3.28)** (6.65)** 
Arizona 3.417 8.871 
 (3.80)** (10.22)** 
California Cent 9.546 9.923 
 (9.82)** (10.59)** 
California East 10.876 12.174 
 (9.93)** (11.54)** 
California North 4.559 7.000 
 (4.11)** (6.55)** 
California South -9.371 -2.534 
 (9.89)** (2.77)** 
Guam 6.674 12.947 
 (3.11)** (6.26)** 
Hawaii 6.305 11.502 
 (4.71)** (8.92)** 
Idaho 4.603 9.151 
 (3.48)** (7.19)** 
Montana 17.911 20.099 
 (14.58)** (16.97)** 
Nevada 9.893 11.180 
 (8.80)** (10.32)** 
N Mariana Island 2.491 10.573 
 (0.64) (2.83)** 
Oregon 1.249 3.337 
 (1.07) (2.96)** 
Washington East 4.787 8.121 
 (3.86)** (6.80)** 
Washington West -0.340 3.479 
 (0.31) (3.31)** 
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Colorado 4.554 7.920 
 (4.01)** (7.23)** 
Kansas 10.260 13.662 
 (9.44)** (13.05)** 
New Mexico 4.370 9.677 
 (4.74)** (10.87)** 
Oklahoma East 18.057 19.869 
 (9.24)** (10.56)** 
Oklahoma North 14.872 16.939 
 (10.19)** (12.06)** 
Oklahoma West 12.912 14.379 
 (9.97)** (11.53)** 
Utah 3.115 5.100 
 (2.94)** (5.00)** 
Wyoming 15.170 17.821 
 (11.57)** (14.11)** 
Alabama Mid 17.264 18.939 
 (12.14)** (13.83)** 
Alabama North 29.119 29.912 
 (25.00)** (26.65)** 
Alabama South 8.079 12.809 
 (6.67)** (10.97)** 
Florida Mid 21.671 23.173 
 (22.76)** (25.27)** 
Florida North 31.480 34.086 
 (25.48)** (28.65)** 
Florida South 24.732 26.221 
 (26.49)** (29.16)** 
Georgia Mid 16.204 22.986 
 (13.06)** (19.23)** 
Georgia North 29.120 28.222 
 (27.02)** (27.19)** 
Georgia South 22.755 27.774 
 (18.17)** (23.02)** 
Drug Trafficking  -108.329 
  (57.76)** 
Firearms  -80.900 
  (42.77)** 
Fraud  -46.040 
  (24.02)** 
Immigration  -62.050 
  (32.43)** 
Manslaughter  -89.669 
  (31.46)** 
Kidnapping/hostage  -14.535 
  (4.84)** 
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Sexual Abuse  -54.852 
  (26.98)** 
Assault  -72.225 
  (36.04)** 
Robbery  -71.587 
  (36.72)** 
Arson  -89.334 
  (32.08)** 
Drug Communication  -131.015 
  (63.64)** 
Drug Possession  -57.278 
  (27.27)** 
Burglary/breaking and entering  -91.375 
  (29.18)** 
Auto Theft  -45.636 
  (17.19)** 
Larceny  -50.749 
  (25.89)** 
Embezzlement  -43.313 
  (21.02)** 
Forgery/counterfeiting  -67.554 
  (34.12)** 
Bribery  -66.392 
  (30.10)** 
Tax offenses  -93.552 
  (46.64)** 
Money laundering  -88.001 
  (44.72)** 
Racketeering  -79.431 
  (40.36)** 
Gambling/lottery  -77.861 
  (30.39)** 
Civil rights  -77.467 
  (27.40)** 
Pornography prostitution  -28.876 
  (14.59)** 
Offenses in prison  -108.528 
  (52.14)** 
Administrative justice  -89.297 
  (45.66)** 
Environmental  -53.738 
  (22.63)** 
National defense  -106.048 
  (38.84)** 
Antitrust violations  -70.100 
  (14.50)** 
54 
Food and drug  -52.903 
  (19.59)** 
Traffic violations and other  -64.839 
  (32.92)** 
Child Pornography  -7.178 
  (3.67)** 
Obscenity  -58.101 
  (11.75)** 
Prostitution  -31.350 
  (11.65)** 
_cons -54.179 -11.018 
 (59.83)** (5.22)** 
R2 0.37 0.41 
N 974,799 974,799 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 2.1, full 
Predicting Sentence Length With Crime Type Interactions. 
Sentence Length (mo.)     1 
Crime Type 
Interactions 
Post Booker 1.489 
 (1.90) 
Criminal History 12.717 
 (114.58)** 
Post Booker X Criminal History -1.152 
 (9.67)** 
Initial Level 5.310 
 (175.87)** 
Post Booker X Initial Level 0.099 
 (3.11)** 
Drug Trafficking -105.805 
 (53.71)** 



















Other non-White race -0.042 
 (0.05) 
Post Booker X Black 1.206 
 (2.35)* 
Post Booker X Hispanic 0.115 
 (0.20) 




Post Booker X Female -0.857 
 (1.54) 
Resident/Legal Alien -0.988 
 (1.31) 
Illegal Alien 1.367 
 (2.22)* 
Citizenship unknown -1.139 
 (0.98) 
Extradited Alien 7.537 
 (5.39)** 
Post Booker X Resident/Legal Alien -0.362 
 (0.44) 
Post Booker X Illegal Alien 1.797 
 (2.70)** 
Post Booker X Citizenship Unknown 1.619 
 (1.21) 
High School Graduate 0.183 
 (0.44) 
Some College -0.305 
 (0.58) 
College graduate 1.284 
 (1.58) 
Post Booker X H.S. Graduate 0.136 
 (0.30) 
Post Booker X Some College -0.038 
 (0.07) 
Post Booker X College Graduate -1.342 
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 (1.54) 
Number of Dependents 1.018 
 (10.33)** 




Post Booker X Trial 4.681 
 (5.26)** 






New Hampshire 14.128 
 (9.86)** 
Puerto Rico 24.931 
 (24.89)** 




New York East -1.021 
 (1.07) 
New York North 14.766 
 (12.97)** 
New York South 7.685 
 (8.38)** 






New Jersey 8.421 
 (8.50)** 
Penn. East 15.761 
 (15.87)** 
Penn. Mid 15.356 
 (13.80)** 
Penn. West 14.095 
 (12.39)** 





N Carolina East 32.204 
 (30.80)** 
N Carolina Mid 26.934 
 (23.81)** 
N Carolina West 25.779 
 (23.61)** 
South Carolina 27.007 
 (27.90)** 
Virginia East 31.104 
 (33.01)** 
Virginia West 24.449 
 (21.83)** 
W Virginia North 16.571 
 (13.62)** 
W Virginia South 20.114 
 (15.59)** 
Louisiana East 25.336 
 (21.85)** 
Louisiana Middle 17.188 
 (11.52)** 
Louisiana West 24.300 
 (20.22)** 
Miss. North 11.180 
 (7.61)** 
Miss. South 18.851 
 (15.73)** 
Texas East 23.497 
 (23.80)** 
Texas North 33.009 
 (34.40)** 
Texas South 12.229 
 (14.23)** 
Texas West 14.073 
 (16.37)** 
Kentucky East 21.441 
 (19.72)** 
Kentucky West 16.499 
 (13.41)** 
Michigan East 13.710 
 (13.70)** 
Michigan West 22.906 
 (19.90)** 
Ohio North 11.429 
 (11.45)** 
Ohio South 6.277 
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 (5.95)** 
Tennessee East 27.517 
 (26.71)** 
Tennessee Mid 16.211 
 (12.84)** 
Tennessee West 16.119 
 (15.10)** 
Illinois Cent 33.776 
 (28.50)** 
Illinois North 18.760 
 (19.13)** 
Illinois South 32.922 
 (27.32)** 
Indiana North 13.778 
 (11.81)** 
Indiana South 33.497 
 (27.47)** 
Wisconsin East 7.612 
 (6.59)** 
Wisconsin West 25.729 
 (17.49)** 
Arkansas East 16.212 
 (13.49)** 
Arkansas West 18.912 
 (14.21)** 
Iowa North 32.168 
 (27.31)** 




Missouri East 9.116 
 (9.19)** 




North Dakota 11.541 
 (8.47)** 






California Cent 9.804 
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 (10.47)** 
California East 11.960 
 (11.34)** 
California North 6.817 
 (6.38)** 
















Washington East 7.886 
 (6.60)** 






New Mexico 9.421 
 (10.59)** 
Oklahoma East 19.725 
 (10.48)** 
Oklahoma North 16.780 
 (11.95)** 






Alabama Mid 18.662 
 (13.63)** 
Alabama North 29.772 
 (26.53)** 
Alabama South 12.599 
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 (10.79)** 
Florida Mid 22.917 
 (24.99)** 
Florida North 33.752 
 (28.37)** 
Florida South 25.927 
 (28.83)** 
Georgia Mid 22.731 
 (19.02)** 
Georgia North 28.037 
 (27.02)** 














Drug Communication -131.076 
 (63.68)** 
Drug Possession -57.616 
 (27.42)** 
Burglary/breaking and entering -91.677 
 (29.28)** 










Tax offenses -93.722 
 (46.74)** 







Civil rights -77.645 
 (27.47)** 
Pornography prostitution -29.001 
 (14.65)** 
Offenses in prison -108.710 
 (52.24)** 




National defense -106.106 
 (38.86)** 
Antitrust violations -70.297 
 (14.55)** 
Food and drug -53.067 
 (19.65)** 
Traffic violations and other -64.984 
 (33.00)** 










* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table 3.1, full 
Predicting Sentence Length By Crime Type With Demographic Interactions. 
Sentence Length     1 
  All 
     2 
Drug T. 
    3 
Firearms 
    4 
Fraud 
     5 
Immigration 
Post Booker 1.489 8.877 7.027 -5.392 -5.964 
 (1.90) (7.48)** (1.92) (3.83)** (6.23)** 
Criminal History 12.717 17.407 9.737 4.844 7.821 
 (114.58)** (120.37)** (20.04)** (20.28)** (118.65)** 
Post Booker X Crim. Hist. -1.152 -0.822 -1.907 1.768 -1.528 
 (9.67)** (5.27)** (3.66)** (6.83)** (21.93)** 
Initial Level 5.310 5.585 6.914 1.442 1.457 
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 (175.87)** (167.50)** (43.91)** (13.32)** (22.82)** 
Post Booker X Initial Level 0.099 -0.205 -0.028 0.448 0.856 
 (3.11)** (5.72)** (0.17) (3.95)** (12.41)** 
Drug Trafficking -105.805     
 (53.71)**     
Post Booker X Drug T. -3.002     
 (4.28)**     
Firearms -87.727     
 (44.06)**     
Post Booker X Firearms 7.793     
 (10.77)**     
Fraud -51.853     
 (25.74)**     
Post Booker X Fraud 6.564     
 (9.02)**     
Immigration -63.115     
 (31.17)**     
Post Booker X Immigration 1.058     
 (1.36)     
Black 4.239 5.877 -1.994 -3.497 -0.547 
 (8.93)** (9.71)** (1.12) (4.67)** (0.87) 
Hispanic -0.534 3.007 1.926 -3.951 0.497 
 (0.99) (4.91)** (0.67) (3.64)** (1.15) 
Other non-White race -0.042 0.488 8.485 -2.957 -2.906 
 (0.05) (0.36) (1.74) (1.94) (3.51)** 
Post Booker X Black 1.206 1.015 6.958 0.572 2.264 
 (2.35)* (1.55) (3.64)** (0.71) (3.31)** 
Post Booker X Hispanic 0.115 1.936 -0.606 -1.199 0.084 
 (0.20) (2.94)** (0.20) (1.04) (0.18) 
Post Booker X Other Non-White Race 1.275 3.330 -2.907 -1.366 -0.898 
 (1.30) (2.31)* (0.56) (0.84) (1.00) 
Female -7.504 -12.308 -0.781 -3.538 -3.833 
 (14.59)** (18.93)** (0.20) (4.83)** (9.51)** 
Post Booker X Female -0.857 -1.409 -5.790 -3.029 1.136 
 (1.54) (2.00)* (1.34) (3.84)** (2.67)** 
Resident/Legal Alien -0.988 -0.763 10.437 -1.456 2.911 
 (1.31) (0.95) (1.60) (1.15) (5.22)** 
Illegal Alien 1.367 0.132 6.290 -1.861 5.247 
 (2.22)* (0.19) (1.38) (1.37) (14.96)** 
Citizenship Unknown -1.139 0.416 1.810 -0.335 3.360 
 (0.98) (0.36) (0.15) (0.14) (4.30)** 
Extradited Alien 7.537 11.417 110.102 27.359 7.092 
 (5.39)** (8.85)** (3.97)** (8.13)** (5.04)** 
Post Booker X Resident/Legal Alien -0.362 0.332 -1.078 3.148 2.875 
 (0.44) (0.38) (0.15) (2.28)* (4.71)** 
Post Booker X Illegal Alien 1.797 2.338 -2.990 1.453 3.013 
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 (2.70)** (3.13)** (0.62) (0.99) (7.86)** 
Post Booker X Citizenship Unknown 1.619 0.825 22.580 3.261 2.782 
 (1.21) (0.62) (1.74) (1.19) (2.97)** 
High School Graduate 0.183 -0.363 3.092 1.853 1.843 
 (0.44) (0.73) (1.82) (1.99)* (6.42)** 
Some College -0.305 -1.846 7.778 4.032 -0.438 
 (0.58) (2.88)** (3.07)** (4.33)** (0.97) 
College graduate 1.284 -3.326 6.930 5.828 -1.529 
 (1.58) (2.46)* (1.11) (5.41)** (1.99)* 
Post Booker X H.S. Grad 0.136 -0.452 -1.916 1.027 -1.019 
 (0.30) (0.84) (1.04) (1.02) (3.36)** 
Post Booker X Some College -0.038 -0.851 -5.919 1.661 0.128 
 (0.07) (1.22) (2.17)* (1.64) (0.27) 
Post Booker X College Graduate -1.342 0.451 -3.999 1.076 0.019 
 (1.54) (0.31) (0.59) (0.92) (0.02) 
Number of Dependents 1.018 0.838 -1.644 0.143 0.135 
 (10.33)** (6.81)** (3.33)** (0.72) (2.66)** 
Post Booker X No. of Dependents -0.628 0.054 -0.285 0.083 -0.174 
 (5.93)** (0.40) (0.54) (0.39) (3.23)** 
Trial 80.453 107.745 96.359 28.133 19.737 
 (98.72)** (106.72)** (33.57)** (19.05)** (24.66)** 
Post Booker X Trial 4.681 -5.602 38.971 14.759 2.298 
 (5.26)** (5.01)** (12.45)** (9.37)** (2.62)** 
Year Trend -0.308 -0.965 0.185 0.760 -0.452 
 (14.69)** (34.88)** (1.93) (19.06)** (43.63)** 
Maine 14.184 29.889 24.541 -7.105 -4.808 
 (9.24)** (15.93)** (4.31)** (2.49)* (3.24)** 
Massachusetts 10.960 22.516 13.392 1.963 1.666 
 (9.93)** (16.83)** (2.70)** (1.14) (1.49) 
New Hampshire 14.128 25.250 32.337 -1.270 -4.459 
 (9.86)** (14.47)** (5.08)** (0.59) (3.08)** 
Puerto Rico 24.931 37.676 41.507 -2.889 0.511 
 (24.89)** (32.26)** (9.61)** (1.58) (0.49) 
Rhode Island 10.634 24.070 12.549 -0.555 -1.240 
 (6.63)** (11.74)** (1.94) (0.20) (0.95) 
Connecticut 6.094 8.202 14.528 1.504 -4.187 
 (5.23)** (5.91)** (2.79)** (0.83) (2.95)** 
New York East -1.021 -3.216 20.925 -1.181 1.803 
 (1.07) (2.82)** (4.59)** (0.79) (1.77) 
New York North 14.766 22.356 19.004 -0.369 -4.624 
 (12.97)** (16.02)** (3.40)** (0.19) (4.40)** 
New York South 7.685 9.502 14.716 2.714 2.842 
 (8.38)** (8.50)** (3.50)** (1.95) (2.83)** 
New York West 12.613 25.790 18.405 -4.453 -4.177 
 (11.81)** (19.52)** (3.86)** (2.59)** (3.74)** 
Vermont -4.228 3.537 16.648 -4.538 -7.469 
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 (2.90)** (2.18)* (2.71)** (1.53) (5.47)** 
Delaware 2.402 10.530 2.114 4.510 -3.123 
 (1.41) (4.05)** (0.36) (1.60) (2.10)* 
New Jersey 8.421 8.940 15.697 2.407 5.554 
 (8.50)** (7.04)** (3.57)** (1.62) (4.96)** 
Penn. East 15.761 13.385 51.081 2.692 1.685 
 (15.87)** (10.62)** (12.48)** (1.81) (1.55) 
Penn. Mid 15.356 23.986 41.266 -0.656 -4.961 
 (13.80)** (17.53)** (7.41)** (0.37) (4.11)** 
Penn. West 14.095 29.536 23.426 -1.374 -0.016 
 (12.39)** (21.37)** (4.80)** (0.78) (0.01) 
Virgin Islands 9.085 20.812 15.022 -7.314 -2.549 
 (4.48)** (7.69)** (1.75) (1.85) (1.96) 
Maryland 19.644 26.078 39.064 8.189 6.645 
 (19.21)** (20.53)** (9.15)** (5.10)** (5.98)** 
N Carolina East 32.204 45.465 46.527 11.688 5.917 
 (30.80)** (34.93)** (11.54)** (6.34)** (5.07)** 
N Carolina Mid 26.934 48.548 39.664 6.972 8.009 
 (23.81)** (32.93)** (9.43)** (3.12)** (7.14)** 
N Carolina West 25.779 40.144 36.866 14.130 0.922 
 (23.61)** (30.77)** (8.29)** (7.71)** (0.75) 
South Carolina 27.007 52.221 41.186 0.903 -4.453 
 (27.90)** (43.69)** (10.17)** (0.60) (4.16)** 
Virginia East 31.104 51.047 57.372 9.288 -3.519 
 (33.01)** (44.47)** (13.97)** (6.37)** (3.46)** 
Virginia West 24.449 37.058 47.396 -0.459 5.529 
 (21.83)** (28.95)** (10.13)** (0.24) (3.40)** 
W Virginia North 16.571 36.860 18.310 -3.859 -6.894 
 (13.62)** (27.71)** (3.45)** (1.33) (3.07)** 
W Virginia South 20.114 35.945 25.058 0.822 -3.546 
 (15.59)** (25.16)** (4.56)** (0.31) (1.24) 
Louisiana East 25.336 47.848 31.898 0.936 -1.629 
 (21.85)** (33.36)** (6.41)** (0.51) (1.42) 
Louisiana Middle 17.188 35.602 16.776 7.476 2.009 
 (11.52)** (16.74)** (3.06)** (3.81)** (1.37) 
Louisiana West 24.300 44.309 39.670 0.686 2.027 
 (20.22)** (28.39)** (7.61)** (0.37) (1.56) 
Miss. North 11.180 20.263 29.850 1.917 -0.252 
 (7.61)** (10.67)** (5.17)** (0.80) (0.10) 
Miss. South 18.851 42.138 25.788 2.210 2.143 
 (15.73)** (26.60)** (5.08)** (1.24) (1.66) 
Texas East 23.497 42.800 31.302 4.442 3.078 
 (23.80)** (36.56)** (7.20)** (2.65)** (2.92)** 
Texas North 33.009 54.519 55.432 11.816 10.136 
 (34.40)** (45.13)** (13.17)** (7.76)** (10.20)** 
Texas South 12.229 26.021 28.168 11.548 -2.145 
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 (14.23)** (24.55)** (6.94)** (7.55)** (2.25)* 
Texas West 14.073 28.690 21.825 1.077 -2.946 
 (16.37)** (27.52)** (5.45)** (0.71) (3.09)** 
Kentucky East 21.441 33.272 35.009 3.381 -3.281 
 (19.72)** (26.56)** (7.48)** (1.74) (2.43)* 
Kentucky West 16.499 22.262 45.244 -3.413 -1.833 
 (13.41)** (14.93)** (8.57)** (1.70) (1.23) 
Michigan East 13.710 23.508 26.880 0.769 -3.124 
 (13.70)** (18.70)** (6.38)** (0.50) (2.92)** 
Michigan West 22.906 39.756 28.894 6.186 -0.977 
 (19.90)** (27.37)** (5.96)** (3.21)** (0.89) 
Ohio North 11.429 22.332 15.277 -0.970 2.065 
 (11.45)** (17.98)** (3.62)** (0.63) (1.76) 
Ohio South 6.277 13.194 23.971 -1.546 -4.237 
 (5.95)** (10.27)** (5.24)** (0.92) (3.68)** 
Tennessee East 27.517 43.370 46.089 -2.103 2.096 
 (26.71)** (36.12)** (11.04)** (1.07) (1.73) 
Tennessee Mid 16.211 31.083 27.173 2.923 5.498 
 (12.84)** (18.97)** (5.63)** (1.36) (4.41)** 
Tennessee West 16.119 28.799 29.147 0.326 2.866 
 (15.10)** (21.26)** (7.11)** (0.19) (2.00)* 
Illinois Cent 33.776 58.958 31.078 3.373 -3.029 
 (28.50)** (42.50)** (6.26)** (1.57) (2.54)* 
Illinois North 18.760 25.849 44.585 6.951 8.574 
 (19.13)** (20.94)** (9.56)** (4.84)** (8.20)** 
Illinois South 32.922 55.282 30.764 7.790 -1.325 
 (27.32)** (39.97)** (6.14)** (3.82)** (0.88) 
Indiana North 13.778 30.894 18.426 0.055 3.615 
 (11.81)** (20.42)** (4.26)** (0.03) (2.09)* 
Indiana South 33.497 46.344 37.692 4.341 14.332 
 (27.47)** (32.23)** (7.20)** (2.16)* (9.97)** 
Wisconsin East 7.612 13.991 18.074 0.261 4.358 
 (6.59)** (9.98)** (3.87)** (0.13) (3.25)** 
Wisconsin West 25.729 43.825 32.261 -0.615 3.629 
 (17.49)** (24.37)** (5.34)** (0.25) (2.49)* 
Arkansas East 16.212 32.657 23.177 -1.063 -1.061 
 (13.49)** (22.33)** (4.53)** (0.52) (0.78) 
Arkansas West 18.912 27.024 21.243 1.449 -1.514 
 (14.21)** (15.68)** (3.41)** (0.54) (1.40) 
Iowa North 32.168 51.198 30.289 9.134 -1.225 
 (27.31)** (37.60)** (6.26)** (3.59)** (1.13) 
Iowa South 22.708 46.397 18.376 -1.774 1.101 
 (19.46)** (33.95)** (3.85)** (0.79) (0.97) 
Minnesota 9.575 13.370 23.560 7.443 5.250 
 (8.61)** (10.14)** (4.58)** (4.25)** (4.36)** 
Missouri East 9.116 19.193 20.932 0.247 -4.464 
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 (9.19)** (16.09)** (5.12)** (0.16) (3.53)** 
Missouri West 12.596 23.615 20.967 1.668 2.136 
 (12.49)** (18.91)** (5.23)** (0.99) (1.86) 
Nebraska 14.242 32.896 12.531 -2.800 -1.753 
 (13.54)** (27.10)** (2.73)** (1.45) (1.64) 
North Dakota 11.541 28.597 13.524 -5.571 -8.886 
 (8.47)** (16.53)** (2.24)* (1.83) (7.41)** 
South Dakota 14.121 35.701 9.990 -3.786 -4.947 
 (12.11)** (22.41)** (1.67) (1.64) (3.92)** 
Alaska 9.960 20.598 15.686 -0.733 4.368 
 (6.56)** (11.57)** (2.44)* (0.26) (2.04)* 
Arizona 8.679 15.949 22.051 -4.971 -2.648 
 (10.00)** (14.85)** (5.28)** (2.92)** (2.77)** 
California Cent 9.804 15.030 16.611 4.482 2.498 
 (10.47)** (12.51)** (3.59)** (3.19)** (2.52)* 
California East 11.960 24.255 26.709 3.029 0.062 
 (11.34)** (17.52)** (5.17)** (1.82) (0.06) 
California North 6.817 16.147 4.732 0.777 3.168 
 (6.38)** (11.35)** (1.03) (0.48) (2.95)** 
California South -2.689 6.531 7.300 -5.018 -4.157 
 (2.94)** (5.94)** (1.11) (2.63)** (4.31)** 
Guam 12.852 21.521 13.998 -6.359 -0.953 
 (6.22)** (7.51)** (1.23) (1.92) (0.57) 
Hawaii 11.350 24.838 16.614 3.019 -1.881 
 (8.80)** (16.68)** (2.68)** (1.36) (1.27) 
Idaho 9.012 23.960 14.633 -1.582 -6.674 
 (7.08)** (14.57)** (2.60)** (0.61) (6.31)** 
Montana 19.899 41.576 20.753 1.909 1.257 
 (16.80)** (27.82)** (4.18)** (0.90) (0.96) 
Nevada 11.049 26.048 15.405 4.263 0.226 
 (10.20)** (16.74)** (3.42)** (2.48)* (0.22) 
N Mariana Island 10.547 35.956 4.130 -4.424 -6.853 
 (2.83)** (7.43)** (0.17) (0.89) (2.51)* 
Oregon 3.158 14.370 4.208 -2.214 0.469 
 (2.80)** (9.78)** (0.90) (1.11) (0.42) 
Washington East 7.886 19.988 13.463 -7.355 0.025 
 (6.60)** (12.82)** (2.62)** (3.11)** (0.02) 
Washington West 3.261 11.353 7.544 2.882 -8.658 
 (3.11)** (8.71)** (1.57) (1.74) (8.30)** 
Colorado 7.749 11.316 11.045 1.140 -1.177 
 (7.08)** (7.29)** (2.39)* (0.61) (1.16) 
Kansas 13.419 31.478 17.785 -1.692 1.581 
 (12.82)** (24.20)** (4.08)** (0.89) (1.51) 
New Mexico 9.421 13.840 17.527 -2.559 -8.148 
 (10.59)** (12.26)** (3.91)** (1.11) (8.52)** 
Oklahoma East 19.725 39.048 26.092 -0.421 8.589 
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 (10.48)** (15.28)** (3.86)** (0.12) (2.59)** 
Oklahoma North 16.780 31.654 28.338 0.399 -2.700 
 (11.95)** (15.60)** (5.58)** (0.17) (2.02)* 
Oklahoma West 14.253 30.625 21.145 1.285 1.297 
 (11.43)** (16.80)** (3.99)** (0.64) (1.08) 
Utah 4.969 19.901 13.020 -2.054 -6.180 
 (4.87)** (13.91)** (3.06)** (1.14) (6.28)** 
Wyoming 17.688 40.787 25.843 -7.037 -9.136 
 (14.00)** (26.77)** (5.00)** (2.20)* (8.18)** 
Alabama Mid 18.662 32.819 28.647 11.462 -3.592 
 (13.63)** (16.74)** (5.61)** (5.20)** (2.59)** 
Alabama North 29.772 33.391 32.127 0.287 1.411 
 (26.53)** (21.61)** (7.68)** (0.16) (1.10) 
Alabama South 12.599 29.775 21.201 -6.839 -1.666 
 (10.79)** (20.94)** (4.68)** (3.67)** (1.09) 
Florida Mid 22.917 35.796 45.520 6.366 -4.611 
 (24.99)** (32.39)** (11.04)** (4.34)** (4.70)** 
Florida North 33.752 57.260 47.309 2.252 -1.650 
 (28.37)** (39.95)** (9.45)** (1.13) (1.36) 
Florida South 25.927 33.408 56.090 17.178 2.988 
 (28.83)** (30.38)** (13.71)** (12.51)** (3.05)** 
Georgia Mid 22.731 37.213 35.121 5.359 5.008 
 (19.02)** (24.67)** (6.79)** (2.52)* (3.54)** 
Georgia North 28.037 48.406 52.761 15.224 5.883 
 (27.02)** (35.33)** (12.02)** (9.79)** (5.67)** 
Georgia South 27.529 41.357 37.230 16.750 12.954 
 (22.82)** (27.32)** (8.22)** (8.51)** (8.07)** 
Manslaughter -89.883     
 (31.54)**     
Kidnapping/hostage -14.555     
 (4.85)**     
Sexual Abuse -54.998     
 (27.05)**     
Assault -72.393     
 (36.13)**     
Robbery -71.783     
 (36.83)**     
Arson -89.449     
 (32.13)**     
Drug Communication -131.076     
 (63.68)**     
Drug Possession -57.616     
 (27.42)**     
Burglary/breaking and entering -91.677     
 (29.28)**     
Auto Theft -45.917     
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 (17.30)**     
Larceny -51.099     
 (26.07)**     
Embezzlement -43.606     
 (21.16)**     
Forgery/counterfeiting -67.820     
 (34.26)**     
Bribery -66.562     
 (30.18)**     
Tax offenses -93.722     
 (46.74)**     
Money laundering -88.125     
 (44.80)**     
Racketeering -79.519     
 (40.41)**     
Gambling/lottery -78.034     
 (30.46)**     
Civil rights -77.645     
 (27.47)**     
Pornography prostitution -29.001     
 (14.65)**     
Offenses in prison -108.710     
 (52.24)**     
Administrative justice -89.400     
 (45.72)**     
Environmental -53.928     
 (22.71)**     
National defense -106.106     
 (38.86)**     
Antitrust violations -70.297     
 (14.55)**     
Food and drug -53.067     
 (19.65)**     
Traffic violations and other -64.984     
 (33.00)**     
Child Pornography -7.363     
 (3.76)**     
Obscenity -58.161     
 (11.77)**     
Prostitution -31.537     
 (11.71)**     
_cons -11.034 -147.195 -129.670 -9.419 -12.997 
 (5.01)** (99.82)** (26.32)** (5.19)** (10.05)** 
R2 0.41 0.59 0.29 0.18 0.35 
N 974,799 332,929 110,277 97,613 250,313 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
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Table 4.1, full 
Predicting Sentence Length with Booker, Crime Type, and Race Interaction. 
Dependent Variable: Sentence Length (months)  
 1 
Three Way      
Interaction 
Year Trend -0.301 
 (14.38)** 
Post Booker 3.352 
 (3.91)** 
Criminal History 12.521 
 (112.04)** 
Post Booker X Criminal History -1.069 
 (8.91)** 
Initial Level 5.276 
 (174.21)** 






Other Non-White Race 0.168 
 (0.12) 
Post Booker X Black -3.022 
 (3.01)** 
Post Booker X Hispanic -7.357 
 (6.36)** 




Post Booker X Female -0.773 
 (1.39) 
Resident/Legal Alien -0.490 
 (0.65) 
Illegal Alien 1.728 
 (2.79)** 
Citizenship Unknown -0.558 
 (0.48) 
Extradited Alien 8.715 
 (6.23)** 
Post Booker X Resident/Legal Alien -0.311 
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 (0.38) 
Post Booker X Illegal Alien 1.957 
 (2.93)** 
Post Booker X Citizenship Unknown 1.850 
 (1.38) 
High School Graduate 0.307 
 (0.73) 
Some College -0.071 
 (0.14) 
College Graduate 1.223 
 (1.50) 
Post Booker X High School Graduate 0.100 
 (0.22) 
Post Booker X Some College -0.079 
 (0.14) 
Post Booker X College Graduate -1.583 
 (1.81) 
Number of Dependents 0.947 
 (9.60)** 




Post Booker X Trial 4.526 
 (5.09)** 
Drug Trafficking -106.256 
 (51.70)** 
Post Booker X Drug Trafficking -6.718 
 (7.19)** 
Drug Trafficking X Black 11.515 
 (9.72)** 
Drug Trafficking X Hispanic -8.809 
 (7.06)** 
Drug Trafficking X Other Non-White Race  -1.363 
 (0.61) 
Post Booker X Drug Trafficking X Black 3.901 
 (3.03)** 
Post Booker X Drug Trafficking X Hispanic 9.455 
 (7.00)** 




Post Booker X Firearms 1.325 
 (1.22) 
Firearms X Black -0.468 
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 (0.33) 
Firearms X Hispanic -3.787 
 (1.97)* 
Firearms X Other Non-White Race 7.435 
 (2.20)* 
Post Booker X Firearms X Black 10.828 
 (7.01)** 
Post Booker X Firearms X Hispanic 9.880 
 (4.80)** 




Post Booker X Fraud 3.858 
 (3.84)** 
Fraud X Black -7.661 
 (5.14)** 
Fraud X Hispanic -12.118 
 (6.34)** 
Fraud X Other Non-White Race 0.012 
 (0.00) 
Post Booker X Fraud X Black 5.371 
 (3.32)** 
Post Booker X Fraud X Hispanic 8.714 
 (4.25)** 




Post Booker X Immigration -0.430 
 (0.24) 
Immigration X Black -2.296 
 (0.86) 
Immigration X Hispanic -5.584 
 (2.91)** 
Immigration X Other Non-White Race -3.508 
 (0.99) 
Post Booker X Immigration X Black 3.855 
 (1.33) 
Post Booker X Immigration X Hispanic 6.059 
 (2.94)** 







New Hampshire 14.296 
 (9.99)** 
Puerto Rico 25.083 
 (25.04)** 




New York East -1.241 
 (1.31) 
New York North 15.105 
 (13.28)** 
New York South 7.689 
 (8.39)** 






New Jersey 8.387 
 (8.47)** 
Penn. East 16.165 
 (16.28)** 
Penn. Mid 15.211 
 (13.68)** 
Penn. West 13.232 
 (11.64)** 




N Carolina East 31.788 
 (30.43)** 
N Carolina Mid 26.903 
 (23.80)** 
N Carolina West 25.810 
 (23.66)** 
South Carolina 26.759 
 (27.67)** 
Virginia East 30.757 
 (32.68)** 
Virginia West 24.223 
 (21.64)** 
W Virginia North 16.278 
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 (13.39)** 
W Virginia South 19.268 
 (14.95)** 
Louisiana East 25.213 
 (21.77)** 
Louisiana Middle 17.795 
 (11.93)** 
Louisiana West 24.371 
 (20.30)** 
Miss. North 11.264 
 (7.67)** 
Miss. South 18.906 
 (15.79)** 
Texas East 23.690 
 (24.01)** 
Texas North 33.267 
 (34.70)** 
Texas South 12.619 
 (14.70)** 
Texas West 14.486 
 (16.86)** 
Kentucky East 21.676 
 (19.95)** 
Kentucky West 16.402 
 (13.34)** 
Michigan East 13.773 
 (13.78)** 
Michigan West 22.735 
 (19.77)** 
Ohio North 11.260 
 (11.29)** 
Ohio South 6.307 
 (5.99)** 
Tennessee East 27.783 
 (26.99)** 
Tennessee Mid 16.288 
 (12.92)** 
Tennessee West 16.735 
 (15.69)** 
Illinois Cent 33.200 
 (28.04)** 
Illinois North 18.907 
 (19.30)** 
Illinois South 33.063 
 (27.46)** 
Indiana North 14.011 
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 (12.02)** 
Indiana South 33.602 
 (27.59)** 
Wisconsin East 7.368 
 (6.38)** 
Wisconsin West 25.439 
 (17.31)** 
Arkansas East 16.344 
 (13.61)** 
Arkansas West 18.569 
 (13.97)** 
Iowa North 32.608 
 (27.71)** 




Missouri East 9.373 
 (9.45)** 




North Dakota 12.019 
 (8.83)** 






California Cent 9.728 
 (10.39)** 
California East 12.052 
 (11.43)** 
California North 6.866 
 (6.43)** 

















Washington East 7.817 
 (6.55)** 






New Mexico 9.557 
 (10.75)** 
Oklahoma East 19.479 
 (10.36)** 
Oklahoma North 16.774 
 (11.95)** 






Alabama Mid 19.399 
 (14.18)** 
Alabama North 30.009 
 (26.76)** 
Alabama South 12.755 
 (10.94)** 
Florida Mid 23.036 
 (25.14)** 
Florida North 33.451 
 (28.14)** 
Florida South 25.925 
 (28.81)** 
Georgia Mid 22.762 
 (19.06)** 
Georgia North 28.946 
 (27.91)** 















Drug Communication -130.250 
 (63.20)** 
Drug Possession -57.864 
 (27.50)** 
Burglary/breaking and entering -91.749 
 (29.33)** 










Tax offenses -93.828 
 (46.73)** 






Civil rights -77.646 
 (27.46)** 
Pornography prostitution -29.847 
 (15.04)** 
Offenses in prison -107.463 
 (51.60)** 




National defense -107.356 
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 (39.33)** 
Antitrust violations -71.327 
 (14.77)** 
Food and drug -54.318 
 (20.12)** 
Traffic violations and other -65.080 
 (33.02)** 










* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table 5, full 
Predicting Sentence Length with Endogenous Crime Severity Variable. 
Dependent Variable: Sentence Length 
(months) 
  
   1   
  Initial Level 
       2 
   Final Level 
Year Trend -0.308 -0.607 
 (14.69)** (30.51)** 
Post Booker 1.489 4.559 
 (1.90) (6.34)** 
Criminal History 12.717 8.382 
 (114.58)** (77.82)** 
Post Booker X Criminal History -1.152 -0.569 
 (9.67)** (4.93)** 
Initial Level 5.310  
 (175.87)**  
Post Booker X Initial Level 0.099  
 (3.11)**  
Final Level  5.432 
  (224.79)** 
Post Booker X Final Level  -0.179 
  (7.03)** 
Drug Trafficking -105.805 -103.246 
 (53.71)** (56.02)** 
Post Booker X Drug Trafficking -3.002 0.831 
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 (4.28)** (1.49) 
Firearms -87.727 -94.566 
 (44.06)** (50.27)** 
Post Booker X Firearms 7.793 7.769 
 (10.77)** (11.57)** 
Fraud -51.853 -93.028 
 (25.74)** (49.31)** 
Post Booker X Fraud 6.564 -3.220 
 (9.02)** (4.81)** 
Immigration -63.115 -101.467 
 (31.17)** (53.32)** 
Post Booker X Immigration 1.058 5.173 
 (1.36) (7.09)** 
Black 4.239 6.854 
 (8.93)** (15.24)** 
Hispanic -0.534 1.258 
 (0.99) (2.46)* 
Other Non-White Race -0.042 2.154 
 (0.05) (2.46)* 
Post Booker X Black 1.206 0.366 
 (2.35)* (0.75) 
Post Booker X Hispanic 0.115 1.309 
 (0.20) (2.39)* 
Post Booker X Other Non-White Race 1.275 0.532 
 (1.30) (0.57) 
Female -7.504 -2.808 
 (14.59)** (5.73)** 
Post Booker X Female -0.857 -0.909 
 (1.54) (1.72) 
Resident/Legal Alien -0.988 1.264 
 (1.31) (1.76) 
Illegal Alien 1.367 -0.128 
 (2.22)* (0.22) 
Citizenship Unknown -1.139 2.496 
 (0.98) (2.25)* 
Extradited Alien 7.537 9.098 
 (5.39)** (6.85)** 
Post Booker X Resident/Legal Alien -0.362 -1.409 
 (0.44) (1.80) 
Post Booker X Illegal Alien 1.797 1.664 
 (2.70)** (2.63)** 
Post Booker X Citizenship Unknown 1.619 1.016 
 (1.21) (0.80) 
High School Graduate 0.183 -0.160 
 (0.44) (0.40) 
Some College -0.305 -2.039 
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 (0.58) (4.10)** 
College Graduate 1.284 -4.710 
 (1.58) (6.11)** 
Post Booker X High School Graduate 0.136 -0.670 
 (0.30) (1.55) 
Post Booker X Some College -0.038 -1.313 
 (0.07) (2.44)* 
Post Booker X College Graduate -1.342 -3.415 
 (1.54) (4.11)** 
Number of Dependents 1.018 0.639 
 (10.33)** (6.82)** 
Post Booker X Number of Dependents -0.628 -0.469 
 (5.93)** (4.66)** 
Trial 80.453 57.452 
 (98.72)** (73.03)** 
Post Booker X Trial 4.681 4.858 
 (5.26)** (5.66)** 
Maine 14.184 17.670 
 (9.24)** (12.12)** 
Massachusetts 10.960 6.462 
 (9.93)** (6.17)** 
New Hampshire 14.128 15.341 
 (9.86)** (11.27)** 
Puerto Rico 24.931 26.906 
 (24.89)** (28.29)** 
Rhode Island 10.634 10.684 
 (6.63)** (7.01)** 
Connecticut 6.094 5.002 
 (5.23)** (4.52)** 
New York East -1.021 0.356 
 (1.07) (0.39) 
New York North 14.766 20.079 
 (12.97)** (18.57)** 
New York South 7.685 2.737 
 (8.38)** (3.14)** 
New York West 12.613 16.303 
 (11.81)** (16.07)** 
Vermont -4.228 -1.667 
 (2.90)** (1.21) 
Delaware 2.402 4.281 
 (1.41) (2.64)** 
New Jersey 8.421 7.320 
 (8.50)** (7.78)** 
Penn. East 15.761 12.063 
 (15.87)** (12.79)** 
Penn. Mid 15.356 15.800 
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 (13.80)** (14.95)** 
Penn. West 14.095 14.708 
 (12.39)** (13.63)** 
Virgin Islands 9.085 14.139 
 (4.48)** (7.35)** 
Maryland 19.644 16.485 
 (19.21)** (17.02)** 
N Carolina East 32.204 27.794 
 (30.80)** (28.02)** 
N Carolina Mid 26.934 25.457 
 (23.81)** (23.69)** 
N Carolina West 25.779 24.815 
 (23.61)** (23.93)** 
South Carolina 27.007 28.004 
 (27.90)** (30.46)** 
Virginia East 31.104 31.889 
 (33.01)** (35.65)** 
Virginia West 24.449 24.616 
 (21.83)** (23.14)** 
W Virginia North 16.571 16.869 
 (13.62)** (14.64)** 
W Virginia South 20.114 19.260 
 (15.59)** (15.72)** 
Louisiana East 25.336 29.323 
 (21.85)** (26.62)** 
Louisiana Middle 17.188 19.759 
 (11.52)** (13.93)** 
Louisiana West 24.300 29.681 
 (20.22)** (26.00)** 
Miss. North 11.180 14.639 
 (7.61)** (10.49)** 
Miss. South 18.851 20.563 
 (15.73)** (18.07)** 
Texas East 23.497 23.596 
 (23.80)** (25.16)** 
Texas North 33.009 28.427 
 (34.40)** (31.20)** 
Texas South 12.229 14.216 
 (14.23)** (17.43)** 
Texas West 14.073 19.892 
 (16.37)** (24.36)** 
Kentucky East 21.441 20.606 
 (19.72)** (19.97)** 
Kentucky West 16.499 19.754 
 (13.41)** (16.91)** 
Michigan East 13.710 13.539 
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 (13.70)** (14.25)** 
Michigan West 22.906 22.537 
 (19.90)** (20.62)** 
Ohio North 11.429 13.659 
 (11.45)** (14.41)** 
Ohio South 6.277 9.866 
 (5.95)** (9.85)** 
Tennessee East 27.517 28.025 
 (26.71)** (28.65)** 
Tennessee Mid 16.211 14.126 
 (12.84)** (11.79)** 
Tennessee West 16.119 14.028 
 (15.10)** (13.84)** 
Illinois Cent 33.776 33.438 
 (28.50)** (29.70)** 
Illinois North 18.760 12.039 
 (19.13)** (12.93)** 
Illinois South 32.922 32.203 
 (27.32)** (28.14)** 
Indiana North 13.778 14.855 
 (11.81)** (13.41)** 
Indiana South 33.497 31.988 
 (27.47)** (27.63)** 
Wisconsin East 7.612 8.052 
 (6.59)** (7.33)** 
Wisconsin West 25.729 24.231 
 (17.49)** (17.34)** 
Arkansas East 16.212 17.824 
 (13.49)** (15.63)** 
Arkansas West 18.912 23.024 
 (14.21)** (18.22)** 
Iowa North 32.168 33.905 
 (27.31)** (30.31)** 
Iowa South 22.708 23.091 
 (19.46)** (20.83)** 
Minnesota 9.575 8.328 
 (8.61)** (7.89)** 
Missouri East 9.116 12.066 
 (9.19)** (12.80)** 
Missouri West 12.596 13.414 
 (12.49)** (14.00)** 
Nebraska 14.242 18.612 
 (13.54)** (18.62)** 
North Dakota 11.541 18.902 
 (8.47)** (14.61)** 
South Dakota 14.121 18.664 
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 (12.11)** (16.85)** 
Alaska 9.960 13.088 
 (6.56)** (9.07)** 
Arizona 8.679 7.938 
 (10.00)** (9.64)** 
California Cent 9.804 7.493 
 (10.47)** (8.42)** 
California East 11.960 8.862 
 (11.34)** (8.85)** 
California North 6.817 7.246 
 (6.38)** (7.17)** 
California South -2.689 3.828 
 (2.94)** (4.40)** 
Guam 12.852 22.178 
 (6.22)** (11.29)** 
Hawaii 11.350 15.288 
 (8.80)** (12.48)** 
Idaho 9.012 13.770 
 (7.08)** (11.39)** 
Montana 19.899 24.122 
 (16.80)** (21.45)** 
Nevada 11.049 13.655 
 (10.20)** (13.27)** 
N Mariana Island 10.547 15.038 
 (2.83)** (4.24)** 
Oregon 3.158 5.243 
 (2.80)** (4.91)** 
Washington East 7.886 9.559 
 (6.60)** (8.43)** 
Washington West 3.261 2.917 
 (3.11)** (2.93)** 
Colorado 7.749 9.524 
 (7.08)** (9.16)** 
Kansas 13.419 15.734 
 (12.82)** (15.83)** 
New Mexico 9.421 23.545 
 (10.59)** (27.83)** 
Oklahoma East 19.725 20.569 
 (10.48)** (11.51)** 
Oklahoma North 16.780 19.587 
 (11.95)** (14.68)** 
Oklahoma West 14.253 13.964 
 (11.43)** (11.79)** 
Utah 4.969 10.786 
 (4.87)** (11.14)** 
Wyoming 17.688 22.675 
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 (14.00)** (18.90)** 
Alabama Mid 18.662 20.497 
 (13.63)** (15.76)** 
Alabama North 29.772 31.244 
 (26.53)** (29.31)** 
Alabama South 12.599 15.594 
 (10.79)** (14.07)** 
Florida Mid 22.917 23.443 
 (24.99)** (26.91)** 
Florida North 33.752 33.540 
 (28.37)** (29.68)** 
Florida South 25.927 21.803 
 (28.83)** (25.53)** 
Georgia Mid 22.731 24.492 
 (19.02)** (21.57)** 
Georgia North 28.037 21.053 
 (27.02)** (21.36)** 
Georgia South 27.529 19.737 
 (22.82)** (17.23)** 
Drug Trafficking -89.883 -92.935 
 (31.54)** (34.35)** 
Firearms -14.555 -41.700 
 (4.85)** (14.64)** 
Fraud -54.998 -76.817 
 (27.05)** (39.87)** 
Immigration -72.393 -101.040 
 (36.13)** (53.48)** 
Manslaughter -71.783 -97.431 
 (36.83)** (52.85)** 
Kidnapping/hostage -89.449 -92.578 
 (32.13)** (35.05)** 
Sexual Abuse -131.076 -122.641 
 (63.68)** (62.76)** 
Assault -57.616 -61.354 
 (27.42)** (30.94)** 
Robbery -91.677 -99.121 
 (29.28)** (33.38)** 
Arson -45.917 -89.573 
 (17.30)** (35.73)** 
Drug Communication -51.099 -83.906 
 (26.07)** (45.59)** 
Drug Possession -43.606 -82.843 
 (21.16)** (42.79)** 
Burglary/breaking and entering -67.820 -93.921 
 (34.26)** (50.43)** 
Auto Theft -66.562 -104.949 
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 (30.18)** (50.45)** 
Larceny -93.722 -97.924 
 (46.74)** (51.60)** 
Embezzlement -88.125 -108.195 
 (44.80)** (58.15)** 
Forgery/counterfeiting -79.519 -96.694 
 (40.41)** (51.88)** 
Bribery -78.034 -81.703 
 (30.46)** (33.68)** 
Tax offenses -77.645 -107.089 
 (27.47)** (40.02)** 
Money laundering -29.001 -77.842 
 (14.65)** (41.62)** 
Racketeering -108.710 -93.922 
 (52.24)** (47.67)** 
Gambling/lottery -89.400 -93.895 
 (45.72)** (50.78)** 
Civil rights -53.928 -86.776 
 (22.71)** (38.78)** 
Pornography prostitution -106.106 -108.958 
 (38.86)** (42.11)** 
Offenses in prison -70.297 -98.677 
 (14.55)** (21.52)** 
Administrative justice -53.067 -77.159 
 (19.65)** (30.29)** 
Environmental -64.984 -87.074 
 (33.00)** (46.95)** 
National defense -7.363 -69.150 
 (3.76)** (37.32)** 
Antitrust violations -58.161 -94.023 
 (11.77)** (20.05)** 
Food and drug -31.537 -61.289 
 (11.71)** (24.00)** 
_cons -11.034 8.663 
 (5.01)** (4.20)** 
R2 0.41 0.47 
N 974,799 976,295 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
Table 6, full 
Predicting Sentence Length With and Without Immigration Crimes. 
Dependent Variable: Sentence Length 
(months) 
  






Year Trend -0.308 -0.374 
 (14.69)** (13.41)** 
Post Booker 1.489 0.826 
 (1.90) (0.88) 
Criminal History 12.717 13.370 
 (114.58)** (92.86)** 
Post Booker X Criminal History -1.152 -0.647 
 (9.67)** (4.17)** 
Initial Level 5.310 5.325 
 (175.87)** (151.50)** 
Post Booker X Initial Level 0.099 0.098 
 (3.11)** (2.64)** 
Drug Trafficking -105.805 -105.217 
 (53.71)** (46.58)** 
Post Booker X Drug Trafficking -3.002 -2.879 
 (4.28)** (3.56)** 
Firearms -87.727 -87.773 
 (44.06)** (38.43)** 
Post Booker X Firearms 7.793 7.308 
 (10.77)** (8.78)** 
Fraud -51.853 -50.842 
 (25.74)** (22.00)** 
Post Booker X Fraud 6.564 6.778 
 (9.02)** (8.12)** 
Immigration -63.115  
 (31.17)**  
Post Booker X Immigration 1.058  
 (1.36)  
Black 4.239 3.389 
 (8.93)** (6.09)** 
Hispanic -0.534 -0.208 
 (0.99) (0.32) 
Other Non-White Race -0.042 1.103 
 (0.05) (1.00) 
Post Booker X Black 1.206 0.869 
 (2.35)* (1.45) 
Post Booker X Hispanic 0.115 0.660 
 (0.20) (0.94) 
Post Booker X Other Non-White Race 1.275 1.492 
 (1.30) (1.27) 
Female -7.504 -7.247 
 (14.59)** (11.65)** 
Post Booker X Female -0.857 -1.313 
 (1.54) (1.95) 
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Resident/Legal Alien -0.988 -0.612 
 (1.31) (0.66) 
Illegal Alien 1.367 -1.028 
 (2.22)* (1.23) 
Citizenship Unknown -1.139 -0.752 
 (0.98) (0.52) 
Extradited Alien 7.537 6.502 
 (5.39)** (3.93)** 
Post Booker X Resident/Legal Alien -0.362 -0.330 
 (0.44) (0.33) 
Post Booker X Illegal Alien 1.797 2.080 
 (2.70)** (2.31)* 
Post Booker X Citizenship Unknown 1.619 1.717 
 (1.21) (1.04) 
High School Graduate 0.183 0.125 
 (0.44) (0.24) 
Some College -0.305 -0.068 
 (0.58) (0.11) 
College Graduate 1.284 1.849 
 (1.58) (1.91) 
Post Booker X High School Graduate 0.136 0.118 
 (0.30) (0.21) 
Post Booker X Some College -0.038 0.286 
 (0.07) (0.42) 
Post Booker X College Graduate -1.342 -0.961 
 (1.54) (0.92) 
Number of Dependents 1.018 1.219 
 (10.33)** (9.47)** 
Post Booker X Number of Dependents -0.628 -0.759 
 (5.93)** (5.45)** 
Trial 80.453 84.402 
 (98.72)** (87.52)** 
Post Booker X Trial 4.681 4.610 
 (5.26)** (4.38)** 
Maine 14.184 14.266 
 (9.24)** (7.83)** 
Massachusetts 10.960 10.243 
 (9.93)** (7.83)** 
New Hampshire 14.128 14.270 
 (9.86)** (8.42)** 
Puerto Rico 24.931 25.965 
 (24.89)** (21.84)** 
Rhode Island 10.634 9.206 
 (6.63)** (4.70)** 
Connecticut 6.094 5.925 
 (5.23)** (4.35)** 
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New York East -1.021 -2.181 
 (1.07) (1.94) 
New York North 14.766 15.492 
 (12.97)** (11.16)** 
New York South 7.685 7.216 
 (8.38)** (6.67)** 
New York West 12.613 13.088 
 (11.81)** (10.37)** 
Vermont -4.228 -5.149 
 (2.90)** (2.97)** 
Delaware 2.402 1.837 
 (1.41) (0.89) 
New Jersey 8.421 8.163 
 (8.50)** (7.02)** 
Penn. East 15.761 15.979 
 (15.87)** (13.66)** 
Penn. Mid 15.356 15.719 
 (13.80)** (12.00)** 
Penn. West 14.095 14.274 
 (12.39)** (10.76)** 
Virgin Islands 9.085 8.365 
 (4.48)** (3.15)** 
Maryland 19.644 19.874 
 (19.21)** (16.51)** 
N Carolina East 32.204 33.081 
 (30.80)** (26.93)** 
N Carolina Mid 26.934 27.851 
 (23.81)** (20.69)** 
N Carolina West 25.779 26.596 
 (23.61)** (20.75)** 
South Carolina 27.007 28.415 
 (27.90)** (24.96)** 
Virginia East 31.104 33.600 
 (33.01)** (30.21)** 
Virginia West 24.449 24.763 
 (21.83)** (18.97)** 
W Virginia North 16.571 16.939 
 (13.62)** (11.99)** 
W Virginia South 20.114 20.760 
 (15.59)** (13.88)** 
Louisiana East 25.336 27.045 
 (21.85)** (19.60)** 
Louisiana Middle 17.188 17.704 
 (11.52)** (10.01)** 
Louisiana West 24.300 25.456 
 (20.22)** (17.99)** 
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Miss. North 11.180 11.963 
 (7.61)** (7.02)** 
Miss. South 18.851 19.745 
 (15.73)** (14.00)** 
Texas East 23.497 24.374 
 (23.80)** (20.91)** 
Texas North 33.009 35.176 
 (34.40)** (30.63)** 
Texas South 12.229 15.356 
 (14.23)** (14.52)** 
Texas West 14.073 15.744 
 (16.37)** (15.24)** 
Kentucky East 21.441 22.021 
 (19.72)** (17.32)** 
Kentucky West 16.499 16.740 
 (13.41)** (11.63)** 
Michigan East 13.710 14.248 
 (13.70)** (12.07)** 
Michigan West 22.906 24.020 
 (19.90)** (17.36)** 
Ohio North 11.429 11.466 
 (11.45)** (9.81)** 
Ohio South 6.277 6.236 
 (5.95)** (5.03)** 
Tennessee East 27.517 27.960 
 (26.71)** (23.16)** 
Tennessee Mid 16.211 16.170 
 (12.84)** (10.79)** 
Tennessee West 16.119 16.387 
 (15.10)** (13.16)** 
Illinois Cent 33.776 35.292 
 (28.50)** (25.11)** 
Illinois North 18.760 19.068 
 (19.13)** (16.47)** 
Illinois South 32.922 33.702 
 (27.32)** (23.93)** 
Indiana North 13.778 14.375 
 (11.81)** (10.58)** 
Indiana South 33.497 34.089 
 (27.47)** (23.87)** 
Wisconsin East 7.612 7.398 
 (6.59)** (5.46)** 
Wisconsin West 25.729 26.221 
 (17.49)** (15.04)** 
Arkansas East 16.212 16.628 
 (13.49)** (11.79)** 
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Arkansas West 18.912 19.677 
 (14.21)** (11.65)** 
Iowa North 32.168 34.730 
 (27.31)** (24.32)** 
Iowa South 22.708 23.361 
 (19.46)** (16.78)** 
Minnesota 9.575 8.805 
 (8.61)** (6.73)** 
Missouri East 9.116 9.351 
 (9.19)** (8.06)** 
Missouri West 12.596 12.392 
 (12.49)** (10.47)** 
Nebraska 14.242 14.211 
 (13.54)** (11.36)** 
North Dakota 11.541 10.570 
 (8.47)** (6.41)** 
South Dakota 14.121 13.557 
 (12.11)** (9.87)** 
Alaska 9.960 9.549 
 (6.56)** (5.40)** 
Arizona 8.679 6.649 
 (10.00)** (6.23)** 
California Cent 9.804 9.311 
 (10.47)** (8.36)** 
California East 11.960 12.767 
 (11.34)** (9.85)** 
California North 6.817 6.142 
 (6.38)** (4.83)** 
California South -2.689 -7.036 
 (2.94)** (6.16)** 
Guam 12.852 12.494 
 (6.22)** (4.98)** 
Hawaii 11.350 10.654 
 (8.80)** (7.04)** 
Idaho 9.012 9.475 
 (7.08)** (5.86)** 
Montana 19.899 19.752 
 (16.80)** (14.18)** 
Nevada 11.049 10.529 
 (10.20)** (7.97)** 
N Mariana Island 10.547 13.201 
 (2.83)** (2.90)** 
Oregon 3.158 2.213 
 (2.80)** (1.65) 
Washington East 7.886 5.569 
 (6.60)** (3.69)** 
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Washington West 3.261 3.235 
 (3.11)** (2.58)* 
Colorado 7.749 6.093 
 (7.08)** (4.47)** 
Kansas 13.419 13.060 
 (12.82)** (10.44)** 
New Mexico 9.421 3.760 
 (10.59)** (3.25)** 
Oklahoma East 19.725 19.525 
 (10.48)** (8.96)** 
Oklahoma North 16.780 17.082 
 (11.95)** (10.21)** 
Oklahoma West 14.253 14.189 
 (11.43)** (9.54)** 
Utah 4.969 2.566 
 (4.87)** (1.99)* 
Wyoming 17.688 19.018 
 (14.00)** (12.35)** 
Alabama Mid 18.662 19.559 
 (13.63)** (12.08)** 
Alabama North 29.772 31.120 
 (26.53)** (23.64)** 
Alabama South 12.599 13.183 
 (10.79)** (9.67)** 
Florida Mid 22.917 25.519 
 (24.99)** (23.37)** 
Florida North 33.752 35.046 
 (28.37)** (24.89)** 
Florida South 25.927 27.855 
 (28.83)** (26.17)** 
Georgia Mid 22.731 23.388 
 (19.02)** (16.71)** 
Georgia North 28.037 30.261 
 (27.02)** (24.37)** 
Georgia South 27.529 28.019 
 (22.82)** (19.91)** 
Drug Trafficking -89.883 -87.976 
 (31.54)** (26.95)** 
Firearms -14.555 -14.246 
 (4.85)** (4.14)** 
Fraud -54.998 -54.164 
 (27.05)** (23.26)** 
Immigration -72.393 -71.751 
 (36.13)** (31.26)** 
Manslaughter -71.783 -71.965 
 (36.83)** (32.21)** 
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Kidnapping/hostage -89.449 -89.049 
 (32.13)** (27.92)** 
Sexual Abuse -131.076 -130.124 
 (63.68)** (55.15)** 
Assault -57.616 -56.388 
 (27.42)** (23.41)** 
Robbery -91.677 -91.371 
 (29.28)** (25.47)** 
Arson -45.917 -46.183 
 (17.30)** (15.18)** 
Drug Communication -51.099 -49.758 
 (26.07)** (22.13)** 
Drug Possession -43.606 -41.826 
 (21.16)** (17.70)** 
Burglary/breaking and entering -67.820 -67.443 
 (34.26)** (29.71)** 
Auto Theft -66.562 -65.207 
 (30.18)** (25.79)** 
Larceny -93.722 -92.309 
 (46.74)** (40.15)** 
Embezzlement -88.125 -86.933 
 (44.80)** (38.55)** 
Forgery/counterfeiting -79.519 -78.966 
 (40.41)** (35.01)** 
Bribery -78.034 -76.273 
 (30.46)** (25.98)** 
Tax offenses -77.645 -76.732 
 (27.47)** (23.69)** 
Money laundering -29.001 -27.939 
 (14.65)** (12.31)** 
Racketeering -108.710 -109.815 
 (52.24)** (46.02)** 
Gambling/lottery -89.400 -88.677 
 (45.72)** (39.56)** 
Civil rights -53.928 -52.401 
 (22.71)** (19.25)** 
Pornography prostitution -106.106 -106.020 
 (38.86)** (33.89)** 
Offenses in prison -70.297 -69.185 
 (14.55)** (12.50)** 
Administrative justice -53.067 -51.627 
 (19.65)** (16.68)** 
Environmental -64.984 -63.837 
 (33.00)** (28.27)** 
National defense -7.363 -5.935 
 (3.76)** (2.64)** 
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Antitrust violations -58.161 -57.133 
 (11.77)** (10.09)** 
Food and drug -31.537 -30.694 
 (11.71)** (9.95)** 
_cons -11.034 -13.952 
 (5.01)** (5.49)** 
R2 0.41 0.39 
N 974,799 724,486 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01 
 
